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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the problem of recurring conflict in post-civil war states 
and seeks to understand the actions undertaken by the international community to 
alleviate this problem.  Specifically, the thesis asks if the strategies of democratization, 
peacekeeping, and economic assistance have a positive impact on a post-civil war state’s 
likelihood of sustaining the peace.  The thesis uses a multi-prong approach to explore this 
question.  First, the author conducts a survey of civil war literature and identifies 
ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development as primary risk factors that lead 
to a recurrence of internal conflict.  Next, the thesis examines the international 
community’s democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance strategies and 
what impact the risk factors have on the execution of these strategies.  Finally, the author 
offers recommendations to the strategies that can help mitigate the influence of the 
dominant risk factors.   
The thesis argues that risks associated with ethnicity, conflict intensity, and 
economic development directly influence the effectiveness of the strategies used by the 
international community.  The likelihood that democratization, peacekeeping, and 
economic assistance strategies will fail to sustain the peace can be assessed before the 
implementation of international action.  Consequently, the ability to identify and assess 
these variables before the execution of policies allows the international community to 
identify high-risk environments and tailor their strategies to mitigate the risks.   
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I. SECURING THE PEACE AFTER CIVIL WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates why actions taken by the international community to 
stabilize post-civil war states fail to secure a sustained peace.  To stabilize post-conflict 
states, The Center for Strategic and International Studies has identified four pillars of 
post-conflict stabilization.  Intended as four distinct issue areas, these four pillars are: 
security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and 
participation.1  Moreover, since the revitalization of international institutions since the 
end of the Cold War, the international community (i.e., the United Nations, the World 
Bank, and states) have commonly used three primary tools to accomplish these pillars.  
Collectively known as peace operations, these include: democratization programs, 
peacekeeping missions, and economic assistance.2  This emphasis by the international 
community on sustaining the peace in post-conflict states has resulted in 45 peacekeeping 
missions undertaken by the United Nations (UN) and World Bank lending to post-
conflict states increased 800 percent from 1980 to 2000 (see Figure 1).3   
                                                 
1 Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the United States Army, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction (2002). 
2 The international community also implements programs to support the justice and reconciliation 
pillar of post-conflict stabilization.  However, unlike the other pillars, no single strategy has been accepted 
as the accepted method of fulfilling the pillar.   
3 World Bank aid to post-conflict states hovered at one billion dollars per year in the early 2000s and 
spiked to a high of four billion dollars in 2003.  Department of Public Information, “United Nations 
Peacekeeping,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ (accessed November 20, 2008); Martin A. Weiss, 
World Bank Post-Conflict Aid: Oversight Issues for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research 
Service,  2004). 
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Figure 1.   Post-Conflict Lending Operations Approved by Region (From: “The World 
Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction”)4 
 
Civil wars have become the most prevalent and deadly form of warfare today.  To 
try to explain why states degenerate into internal violence, scholars have identified 
specific factors that indicate a higher likelihood of civil war onset.  Additionally, research 
on civil wars reveals that 42 percent of civil war states fail to achieve a lasting peace.5  
The objectives of this thesis stem from the question of why states return to violence.  
First, it seeks to understand how the strategies implemented by the international 
community impact the likelihood of post-civil war states remaining at peace.  Second, it 
seeks to explain why the strategies executed by the international community sometimes 
fail.  Third, it offers recommendations on how to help the strategies succeed. 
From a survey of civil war research, the author chose three variables that have 
statistically had the most significant impact on the likelihood of a post-civil war state 
                                                 
4 Alcira Kreimer et al., The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington 
D.C.: The World Bank, 1998), 12. 
5 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, 
no. 4 (2004), 590. 
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returning to violence.  Broadly categorized, these variables are ethnicity, conflict 
intensity, and economic development (the variables will be defined more specifically in 
Chapter II).  The thesis then analyzes the impact of internationally led democratization, 
peacekeeping, and economic assistance programs on the post-conflict state’s stability.  
Next, the thesis examines the impact of the risk variables on the international 
community’s peace operations strategies.  In doing this review, the author presents 
reoccurring impediments that arise because of the variables.  Since these variables are 
identifiable before the implementation of peace operations, the author contends that 
policymakers can anticipate the occurrence of these specific risks and tailor their 
operations to mitigate the negative influence of these variables.  A tailored approach that 
accounts for the specific conditions on the ground will, in turn, substantially increase the 
likelihood of the post-conflict state making the transition to a stable and peaceful nation.6   
B. IMPORTANCE — WHY STUDY POST-CIVIL WAR STATES?   
Over the past fifty years, warfare has transitioned from inter-state wars to intra-
state violence or civil wars.  In their book, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in 
Post-War Societies, James Meernik and David Mason note that while wars between 
sovereign nations dominated international politics for the previous three hundred years, 
“civil wars within nations — revolutions, secessionist wars, ethnic conflicts, and 
terrorism — have become the most frequent and deadly forms of armed conflict since the 
end of World War II” with four times more civil wars occurring as interstate wars.7  
Additionally, they note that while most of the world’s interstate wars occurred within 
Europe and between the boundaries of the other great powers, the Third World has 
become the site of “almost all of the armed conflict that has punctuated the history of the 
                                                 
6 The opposite is also true.  If the risks are not present, the international community will have more 
flexibility in the approach that it uses within the state. 
7 T. David Mason and James D. Meernik, “Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War 
Societies,” eds. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2005), 2. 
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last half century.”8  For a subset of nations, civil war is a chronic condition; about half of 
the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts.9 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis focuses on the problem of recurring civil wars and seeks to understand 
the actions undertaken by the international community to alleviate this problem.  
Specifically, the thesis asks if the strategies of democratization, peacekeeping, and 
economic assistance have a positive impact on a post-civil war state’s likelihood of 
sustaining the peace.  From this overarching question, several other relevant questions 
emerge: What influences the effectiveness of these strategies?  Can the factors that 
impact these strategies be identified before the execution of the policy?  How can 
policymakers tailor these strategies to mitigate the risks?  Have best practices emerged 
from previous peace operations that can be applied for future operations?  What 
recommendations can be offered to increase the effectiveness of international efforts? 
The thesis uses a multi-prong approach to explore these questions.  First, the 
author conducted a survey of civil war literature to identify the primary risk factors that 
lead to a re-ignition of internal conflict.  From this survey, the author selected three 
primary variables — ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development.  Next, the 
author examined the literature surrounding peace operations to understand the objectives 
and effectiveness of the international community’s democratization, peacekeeping, and 
economic assistance strategies.   
The interaction between these significant risk factors and the actions taken by the 
international community are explored to see if and how the risk factors influenced the 
different strategies.  This analysis identified four recurrent features that consistently 
reduced the effectiveness of the international action: (1) the reinforcement of factional  
 
 
                                                 
8 T. David Mason and James D. Meernik, “Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War 
Societies,” 2-3. 
9  T. David Mason, “Sustaining the Peace after Civil War,” US Fed News Service, Including US State 
News (December 27, 2007), iii. 
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divisions produced during the conflict, (2) the empowerment of extremist/militant 
leaders, (3) the funding of militant groups, and (4) the distribution of resources/positions 
along factional lines  
Finally, the author looked at how variations in the strategies influenced the 
dominant risk factors.  If a variation within a specific case appeared to mitigate the factor, 
the author assessed the strategy to determine if the modification could be used globally 
across cases.  These observations are consolidated in recommendations in the conclusion 
of the thesis. 
The author’s hypothesis is that the likelihood that democratization, peacekeeping, 
and economic assistance strategies will fail to sustain the peace can be assessed before 
the implementation of international action.  Risks associated with the factors present 
within the post-civil war state directly influence the effectiveness of the strategies used 
by the international community.  The ability to identify and assess these variables before 
the execution of policies allows the international community to identify high-risk 
environments and tailor their strategies to mitigate the risks.  Conversely, in post-civil 
war cases where the international community failed to account for these variables or 
implemented policies that were not appropriate due to the presence of specific hazards, 
the states will not have a statistically higher probability of remaining at peace than similar 
cases that did not receive international intervention.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Multiple topics hold relevance when writing a literature review for this topic.  The 
most prevalent areas include theories on civil war and post-conflict stabilization.   
1. Civil War Literature 
The literature on civil war provides in-depth discussion and analysis of the 
reasons why individuals within a state’s population choose to violently oppose their own 
governments and fellow citizens.  Theorists have identified four main causes to explain 
the initiation of civil wars: ethnicity, grievances, mobilization, and greed.  
 6
a. Ethnicity 
Proponents of ethnicity as a primary cause of conflict generally follow 
Nicholas Sambanis’ definition of ethnic war “as war among communities (ethnicities) 
that are in conflict over the power relationship that exists between those communities and 
the state.”10  Chaim Kaufman adds to this definition to argue “opposing communities in 
ethnic civil conflicts hold irreconcilable visions of the identity, borders, and citizenship of 
the state.  They do not seek to control a state whose identity all sides accept, but rather to 
redefine or divide the state itself.”11  
In the second edition of his often-cited work, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 
D. L. Horowitz further defines the theoretical causes of ethnic violence.  He presents 
ancient hatred adherents as those who believe ethnic conflict is rooted in old sources of 
enmity and memories of past atrocities.  Primordialists view ethnicity as an exceptionally 
strong affiliation that charges interethnic interactions with the potential for violence. 
Proponents of primordial sociality theory argue that the strength of kinship ties promotes 
altruism in favor of the genetic evolution of the group. The clash of cultures (or 
civilizations) theory proposed by Samuel Huntington suggests that irreconcilable 
differences due to cultural gaps cause fear and conflict that beget violence.12 Fear is also 
at the heart of the theory of the ethnic security dilemma, which suggests that territorial 
intermingling and mutual vulnerability exacerbate assurance problems that may lead to 
preventive wars by ethnic minorities who want to secede to increase their security. 
Finally, ethnic conflict may be the result of mobilization of ethnic groups by elites 
pursuing private interests and capitalizing on the availability of ethnic networks.13 
                                                 
10 Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars have the Same Causes? A Theoretical 
and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1),” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (June 2001), 261. 
11 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 
20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), 138. 
12 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996), 367. 
13 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, 2000); Sambanis, 
Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars have the Same Causes, 260-263. 
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b. Grievance 
Other scholars, and much of the early research on internal conflict, 
emphasize what Collier and Hoeffler have termed grievance factors.14  Starting with Ted 
Gurr’s 1970 book, Why Men Rebel, scholars have argued that civil wars are caused by 
inequality, political oppression, deprivation, and conflicts over scarce resources that 
escalate into violence.15  Additional proponents of the grievance theory include Edward 
Azar, Thomas Homer-Dixon, and Frances Stewart.16  
c. Mobilization 
Theorists such as Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow argue, however, that 
“grievances are not sufficient for organized internal conflict” and point to the need to 
have mobilized groups acting collectively.17  Those who view mobilization as the key to 
civil unrest tend to minimize the importance of inequality or relative deprivation-type 
factors, and follow Tilly’s argument that these conditions are, for the most part, always 
present.18  Given consistent structural reasons for expressing discontent, the ability to 
mobilize resources determines the extent of internal conflict.19  
d. Greed 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have developed an economic model of 
rebellion and have suggested that civil war might be fueled by self-interested behavior, 
                                                 
14 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 563-595. 
15 Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, “Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (June 2005), 320; Benedikt Korf, “Rethinking the Greed-Grievance 
Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Peace Research 42, 
no. 2 (March 2005), 202. 
16 Ibid., 202-203; Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict (Dartmouth 
Aldershot, Hampshire, England, 1990).; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 
Princeton University Press, 1999); Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities,” 
Oxford Development Studies 28, no. 3 (2000), 245-262. 
17 Regan and Norton, Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars, 320; Sidney Tarrow, Power 
in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
18 Regan and Norton, Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars, 321; Charles Tilly, From 
Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978). 
19 Regan and Norton, Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars, 321. 
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such that rebels are motivated by greed rather than grievance.20  Korf summarizes 
Collier’s argument by stating that it is the abundance of lootable resources, rather than 
conflicts over scarce resources, that explains the incidence of civil wars: “while we may 
find grievances in many countries, it is only where the opportunities for economic gain 
— the opportunity and incentives to loot resources — coincide with these grievances that 
rebellion and violence are likely to take place.”21  A host of additional political scientists 
and economists, including V.L Elliot, Hávard Hegre, Marta Reynal-Queral, and Nicholas 
Sambanis, have pointed to a combination of economic decline, dependency on primary 
commodity exports, low per-capita income, and unequal income distribution as a 
potentially explosive combination, especially in a state where young males are 
abundantly available to emerge as “entrepreneurs of violence.”22 
2. Post-Conflict Stabilization 
Disagreements exist over the level of impact that the international community can 
have on fostering lasting peace.  After a series of heavily publicized peace operations 
failures in the 1990s, a multitude of researchers have examined the ineffectiveness of 
international intervention.23  Analysts such as Marina Ottaway and Peter Savodnik argue 
that policy makers must recognize that our nation-building goals must be realistic and 
that sometimes peace and democratization are not always an achievable goal.24   
However, Paul Collier argues that if possible, it makes good policy sense to 
prevent a state from deteriorating.  He points out that states do not live in isolation and 
                                                 
20 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 563-595. 
21 Benedikt Korf, “Functions of Violence Revisited: Greed, Pride and Grievance in Sri Lanka’s Civil 
War,” Progress in Development Studies 6, no. 2 (March 2006), 203. 
22 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 563-595. 
23 See for example Chiyuki Aoi, The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (New 
York: United Nations University Press, 2007); Andrez Sitkowski, UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006); R.E. Utley, Major Powers and Peacekeeping: 
Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); 
Douglas L. Bland, New Missions, Old Problems (Kingston, Ont.: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); 
Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 2002). 
24 Marina Ottaway, “Nation Building,” Foreign Policy, no. 132 (September/October 2002), 16, 22-23.; 
Peter Savodnik and Marina Ottaway, “Can’t Buy Me Democracy,” Foreign Policy, no. 134 (January- 
February 2003), 8. 
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the impacts of state failure include spillover effects such as the spread of refugees, 
cholera, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, and terrorism into distant countries.25  Further, 
James Dobbins argues that nation building is a viable option.  He contends that the sharp 
overall decline in deaths from armed conflict around the world over the past decade 
points to the potential efficacy of nation building.  He states that during the 1990s, deaths 
from armed conflict were averaging over 200,000 per year. Yet, due to effective nation-
building efforts, by 2003 the number had come down to 27,000, a fivefold decrease in 
deaths from civil and international conflict.  Thus, he argues, nation building can be an 
extremely effective tool in creating a foundation for lasting peace.26 
Accordingly, they have produced an abundance of opinions, conditions, and 
policies that prescribe when nation building will both succeed and fail.  Review of their 
research addresses an essential foreign policy question, as it helps policy makers 
understand the scope of factors that impact peace operations and concentrate resources on 
the areas that prove to be the most critical to a state’s success.  Additionally, researching 
this question can help identify counterproductive policies that have led to military coups, 
insurgent activity, and civil wars in the aftermath of failed peace operation efforts. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis explores four major subjects: (1) the civil war state and post-conflict 
risk factors, (2) democratization strategies for post-civil war states, (3) UN peacekeeping 
missions, and (4) economic assistance in post-conflict environments.  The chapter on 
civil war states seeks to present the reader with a basic understanding of civil war, the 
problems faced by states devastated by internal violence, and the factors that indicate a 
higher likelihood of renewed violence.  Multiple but shared objectives exist for the 
chapters dedicated to democratization, peacekeeping, and economic assistance.  Each 
chapter will: first, present the motivations and objectives the international community 
hopes to accomplish with each strategy; second, analyze the research that measures the 
                                                 
25 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 563-595. 
26 James Dobbins, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, RAND Corporation, 
2005), xxxvi. 
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influence of each of the strategies on the likelihood of the post-conflict state sustaining 
the peace; third, examine how ethnicity, conflict intensity, and economic development 
have influenced the success of each approach; fourth, investigate the reasons why these 
factors are influential; and, fifth, provide recommendations on how the strategies can be 
modified to mitigate these risks.   
All chapters thoroughly examine the question of why specific factors are 
influential.  It is the author’s belief that to successfully implement strategies that mitigate 
the risks, the research needs to go beyond tables that show a correlation exists, and 
instead add the details needed to understand why a specific factor impacts the strategy.  
Only after peacebuilders understand the reasons why a specific factor is important can 




II. THE CIVIL WAR STATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Civil wars have important distinctions from both inter-state wars and communal 
violence.  Collier et al. note that unlike international war, civil war is fought outside any 
structure of rules and entirely within the territory of society.  Additionally, unlike 
communal violence, it implies a rebel organization equipped with armaments and staffed 
with full-time recruits.  Such rebel armies usually have little option but to live off the 
land or finance their operations through illicit activities (i.e., kidnappings for ransom or 
narcotics trafficking).  These features typically escalate the social costs and economic 
damage above the costs of either international war or communal violence.27  This chapter 
captures some of the unique features that characterize civil wars.  To accomplish this, the 
chapter is organized into the following five sections: (1) civil war definition, (2) 
discussion of costs incurred during civil war, (3) presentation of the legacy effects that 
occur due to internal conflict, (4) introduction of the factors that indicate the risk of 
renewed conflict, and (5) conclusion.   
B. DEFINING CIVIL WARS 
For this research, the thesis uses a definition of civil war consistent to that found 
in civil war literature.  Civil war occurs when an identifiable rebel organization 
challenges the government militarily and the ensuing violence results in more than 1,000 
combat-related deaths — at least five percent on each side.  Appendix 1 provides a more 
thorough review of the many other considerations that underlie this basic definition.  
C. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL WAR 
1. Economic Costs of Civil War 
During a civil war, society diverts resources from production to actions dedicated 
to survival or destruction.  This characteristic causes a double loss: the lost growth that 
                                                 
27 Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington DC: 
World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 11. 
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occurs as resources are no longer available for economic development, and the loss that 
takes place from the destruction that ensues when these resources are instead used to 
conduct warfare. 
Quantification of the first category indicates that increased government spending 
on the military during civil war directly reduces economic growth.  Collier et al. find that 
during peace, the average developing country (defined as a country with less than $3,000 
per capita GDP) spends about 2.8 percent of GDP on the military.  However, this 
spending increases to an average of five percent during a civil war.28  A 1997 IMF study 
estimated that an additional 2.2 percent of GDP spent on the military over a period of 
seven years (the length of a typical conflict) would cause the state to permanently lose 
approximately two percent of GDP.29  Moreover, this estimate only includes the increase 
in government military spending; the result becomes greater if one also includes the 
resources controlled by rebel groups that are diverted from their primary activities. 
However, the main economic losses that occur from civil war arise from the 
destruction inherent to violent confrontation.  Rebel groups often target physical 
infrastructure as part of their military strategy, including infrastructure that has a 
significant impact on the population’s economic well-being, such as power facilities, 
communication networks, and transportation facilities.  Additionally, rebel and 
government soldiers typically loot and destroy housing, schools, and health facilities.  
Tilman Brück provides an example from the violence in Mozambique, where the conflict 
destroyed 40 percent of immobile capital in the agriculture, communications, and 
administrative sectors.  While the pre-war transportation system provided foreign income 
from goods transported to the neighboring states of Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, 
and Zimbabwe, the conflict destroyed or damaged 208 out of 222 units of rolling stock.30 
                                                 
28 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 14. 
29 Malcolm Knight, Norman Loayza and Delano Villanueva, “What Happened to the Peace 
Dividend?” Finance and Development (March 1997). 
30 Tilman Brück, “Macroeconomic Effects of the War in Mozambique” Queen Elizabeth House 
Working Paper no. 11, 1997). 
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Finally, one must consider the substantial economic impact that occurs due to 
individual material losses during civil war.  Internal violence inevitably generates risks 
that cause segments of the population to flee their homes and often lose the few assets 
they possess.  For example, in a 2001 survey of households in Uganda, Matovu and 
Stewart found that two-thirds of respondents lost all of their assets.  They had their 
houses destroyed, household belongings such as bicycles and furniture looted, and their 
livestock stolen by soldiers.31  Faced with the prospect of such losses, people attempt to 
protect their assets by moving their wealth abroad.  Collier et al. found that prior to 
conflict, the typical civil war country held nine percent of its private wealth abroad; yet, 
by the end of the conflict this had risen to 20 percent.32  
Further, the displacement caused by civil wars severs the social links that families 
and communities exercise to guide individual behavior.  The disruption of these social 
structures weakens the constraints on opportunistic and criminal behavior.  In a study 
undertaken by Michelle Cullen that analyzed the relationship between civil war and the 
transformation of social constraints in Somalia, Guatemala, Cambodia, and Rwanda; she 
found that non-combatants respond to an environment prevalent with criminality and 
opportunism by regressing to subsistence activities.  Cullen explained that during 
conflict, individuals with assets faced a greater risk of being killed.  Consequently, the 
population reduced investments and instead focused on minimalistic activities that were 
less vulnerable to capture.33  As a powerful example, Collier et al. note that the 
subsistence sector increased from 20 percent of GDP to 36 percent during the civil war in 
Uganda.34 
                                                 
31 Stewart, Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities, 122-123. 
32 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Catherine Pattillo, “Africa’s Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain 
Drain as Portfolio Decisions” Journal of African Economies 13, no. 2 (2004), 15. 
33 Michelle L. Cullen, Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital (New York: World 
Bank Publications, 2000), 12-15. 
34 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 16. 
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2. The Human Costs of Civil War 
Unfortunately, economic losses are only one area of social costs experienced by a 
country during civil war.  The most direct social costs are fatalities and population 
displacements.  The percentages of civilian fatalities that occur during a civil war differ 
drastically from the inter-state wars of the twentieth century.   At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, 90 percent of conflict casualties were combatants; however, starting 
with the civil wars of the 1990s, civilians account for 90 percent of the casualties.35   
Azam and Hoeffler note that the increased proportion of civilian casualties and 
the extensive displacements that occur during internal conflict reflect the military 
practices used during civil war.  First, they note that combatants may target civilians to 
plunder material to support their logistical needs.  Furthermore, the rebels often use 
coercion to recruit new members and intimidation to secure material support from non-
combatants, which causes displacement as the civilians flee to avoid conscription.36  
Moreover, this forced recruitment often targets the most vulnerable members of society, 
including children.  In 2003, the UN estimated that around 300,000 underage child 
soldiers were currently serving in militias around the world.37  Finally, they note that 
both government and rebel militaries sometimes deliberately target noncombatants to 
force the migration of civilians who could provide support to the adversary.38 
These factors combine to produce a level of human suffering within the civilian 
population that is almost unimaginable.  During the 1990s, civil wars have killed an 
estimated two million people in Sudan, one million in Angola, three to five million in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, 150,000 in Western Africa, and 200,000 in Burundi.  
Internal conflict in Africa has contributed to more than 50 percent of the population being 
denied clean drinking water and half the population surviving on less than one dollar a 
                                                 
35 Edmund Cairns, A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War (Oxford: Oxford Publications, 
1997). 
36 Jean-Paul Azam and Anke Hoeffler, “Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting Or 
Terror?” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 4 (July 2002), 461-485. 
37 Judith Kumin, “Africa at a Crossroads,” Refugees 2, no. 131 (2003), 18. 
38 Azam and Hoeffler, Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting Or Terror? 461-485. 
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day.39  In addition, globally, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees provided 
assistance to over 20 million internally displaced persons and refugees in 2005 alone (see 
Figure 2 for a map of displaced people in Africa).40  However despite assistance, the 
World Food Program reports that “an estimated 40 million Africans in Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
the Sahel, and West Africa face starvation.”41  
                                                 
39 Kumin, Africa at a Crossroads, 15. 
40 The UN Refugee Agency, Measuring Protection by the Numbers, 2006. 
41 Kumin, Africa at a Crossroads, 15. 
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Figure 2.   Displaced Populations in Africa in 2003 (From: “Africa at a Crossroads”)42 
 
                                                 
42 Kumin, Africa at a Crossroads, 17. 
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D. THE POST-CONFLICT LEGACY 
Unfortunately, the destructive impact of internal violence continues after the 
fighting stops.  The disruption of economic infrastructure, governmental capacity, 
security, medical capability, and social networks create a persisting legacy of poverty and 
misery.  These conditions, in turn, create limitations in the state’s ability to recover from 
the conflict and instead create an environment that strengthens the influence of those in 
the society that call for and would benefit from renewed violence.  Yet, even when the 
state remains in peace, the recovery process often takes decades.  For example, Matovu 
and Stewart note that although Uganda maintained peace and experienced a 
comparatively rapid post-conflict recovery, even by the late 1990s, a decade after the 
resolution of violence, per capita income had only returned to its early 1970s level and 
the revival from subsistence practices had only started to occur.  Additionally, when they 
interviewed Ugandans at the household level, almost two thirds of respondents indicated 
that they were currently worse off than they were before the war.43 
1. The Economic Legacy 
Several of the adverse economic effects that occur during civil war continue to 
impact the post-conflict environment.  During the conflict, military expenditures rise 
from 2.8 to an average of 5 percent of GDP; however, once the conflict ends military 
expenditures seldom return to their pre-war level.  During the first post-conflict decade, 
the average state continues to spend 4.5 percent of GDP on military expenditures.  
Cumulatively, over the first decade of peace, an extra 17 percent of a year’s GDP is 
diverted for increased military spending.44  
Second, capital flight typically continues in the aftermath of civil wars.  Although 
it already reaches an average of 20 percent during a typical conflict, by the end of the first 
decade of post-conflict peace, capital flight had risen further to 26.1 percent.  Collier et 
al. postulate a possible reason for this is that once a country has experienced civil war, it 
                                                 
43 John M. Matovu and Frances Stewart, “Uganda: The Social and Economic Costs of Conflict” In 
War and Underdevelopment, eds. Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Edmund Fitzgerald (Vol. 2, 2001), 
240-245, 270-284. 
44 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 21. 
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is at a much higher risk for renewed violence.  Thus, even once peace has returned, 
people still want to move more of their assets abroad.45  The same is even more prevalent 
for human flight.  Civil war gives an impetus for emigration, but some of those emigrants 
(especially those that immigrate to more advanced countries) then provide a post-conflict 
channel for further emigration. 
2. Political and Economic Institutions 
Rebel leaders often justify their violence as a means to force political and 
economic changes upon the regime that will benefit the population as a whole.  Thus, 
they state that the suffering that occurs due to their actions is a necessary price for the 
population to pay for the redeeming changes they will bring to the society in the future.  
Despite the wartime rhetoric, however, post-civil war states are characterized by 
ineffective political and economic institutions.  This impact on political institutions is 
captured in Polity IV governance index.  On a ten-point scale that indicates the extent 
political institutions are democratic, the typical developing state that is neither at war nor 
in postwar peace achieves an average core of 2.11, while states in their first decade of 
post-conflict peace only attain an average of 1.49.  A related measure sponsored by 
Freedom House reinforces this finding.  The Freedom House uses a seven-point scale 
where, in contrast to Polity IV, a low score indicates more political freedoms than a high 
score.  Within this index, states held an average score of 4.79 prior to the conflict, but 
only attained a score of 5.66 after the war.46  Thus, civil wars typically cause further 
deterioration rather than improvement of political institutions. 
The economic impact of internal violence is quantified in the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).  The CPIA assesses economic 
policy on a five-point scale in four areas — macro-economic, structural, social, and 
public sector management — with a higher score indicating better policies.  Low-income 
countries that are not at war and have not had a civil war in the past decade have an 
                                                 
45 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 21. 
46 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and 
Quantitative Analysis,” The American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000), 779-801. 
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average CPIA sore of 2.75.  However, post-conflict countries averaged only 2.29 for the 
first decade of peace.  Although the numbers may appear close together, they actually 
reflect a substantial deterioration in policies.  Moreover, all four policy areas are worse in 
post-conflict societies: their macroeconomic policies are less stable, their structural 
policies such as trade and infrastructure are less conducive to growth, their social policies 
are less inclusive, and their public sectors are poorly managed.47   
3. The Social Impact 
A third area that experiences a persistently adverse impact from civil war is the 
loss of social capital and the continuation of intense societal conflicts.  As factions have 
been mobilized to kill other members of their society during the conflict, post-civil war 
society contains deep and cumulative social cleavages.  Consequently, the conflict 
dampeners have been weakened — the population has lost its tradition of peaceful 
dispute resolution, factions now view their adversaries as morally inferior, and 
individuals regard other groups with distrust, detestation, and fear.48  This has the effect 
of switching behavior from an equilibrium in which there is an expectation of honesty 
and fairness to one in which there is an expectation of manipulation and corruption.  
Once the norm of honesty has been lost, the incentive for impartial behavior in the future 
is greatly weakened.49 
4. The Human Toll 
Civil wars cause human suffering in many areas, including varying levels of 
physical and psychological trauma. However, the most accurate indicator of the human 
toll is the mortality rate; it is data more likely to be captured and it is consistently defined 
across cultures.  In their study of infant mortality rates in post-conflict populations, 
Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol found a correlation between the length of the conflict and a 
lasting impact on the mortality rate.  They found that during a typical five-year civil war, 
                                                 
47 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 22. 
48 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 168-175. 
49 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 21. 
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the infant mortality rate increased by 13 percent; however, this rate remained elevated 
and, in the first five years of peace, the rate remained 11 percent higher than the 
baseline.50   
These results are collaborated in an in depth study conducted by Guh-Sapir and 
Van Panhuis that studied mortality rates following internal conflict among individuals 
residing as refugees, internally displaced people, and residents of the embattled country.  
They found that mortality rates were higher after conflict than before, and that adult 
mortality rate was generally even higher than the infant mortality rate.  They note that: 
While it might be imagined that the rise in adult mortality is because of the 
greater exposure of adults to the risk of combat death, few of these adult 
deaths are directly combat-related.  We can compare these increases in 
mortality with the estimates of death as a direct result of combat. The 
death of combatants is only a very minor component of the overall rise in 
mortality. These numbers confirm that civil wars kill far more civilians 
even after the conflict is over than the number of combatants that die 
during the conflict.51 
Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett complement these findings in a 1999 study of the 
long-term health effects of civil war in a cross-national analysis of World Health 
Organization data on death and disability broken down by gender, age, and medical or 
type of disease.  They found that civil wars have substantial long-term effects, even after 
controlling for several other factors, which are “overwhelmingly concentrated in the 
civilian population.”  They “estimate that the additional burden of death and disability 
incurred in 1999, from the indirect and lingering effects of civil wars in the years 1991–
97, was approximately equal to that incurred directly and immediately from all wars in 
1999.”  Moreover, they contend that the legacy effects of civil war create conditions that 
foster the lethality of infectious diseases.  Thus, infectious diseases become the most 
important cause of indirect deaths of civil war; a killer that they found disproportionately 
                                                 
50 Anke Hoeffler and Marta Reynal-Querol, “Measuring the Cost of Conflict,” 
http://heisun1.unige.ch/sas/files/portal/issueareas/victims/Victims_pdf/2003_Hoeffler_Reynal.pdf 
(accessed January 19, 2009). 
51 Ibid. 
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affects women and children.52  Table 1 shows the mortality rates due to disease among 
children under five years old during the post-conflict period and in the pre-conflict 
baseline.  
Table 1.   Mortality Rates among Children (From: “Measuring the Costs of Conflict”)53 
Population sample and year  Disease  Mortality Rates 
   Conflict Baseline 
Measles  36.5 10.1 Internally displaced in Somalia 1992  
Diarrheal disease  39.0 20.0 
Kurdish refugees in Iraq, 1991  Diarrheal disease  74.0 22.9 
Sudanese refuges in Northern Uganda, 1994  Meningitis 0.2 0.6 
Rwandan refugees in Zaire, 1994  Diarrheal disease  87.0 20.0 
Respiratory Infectious  41.4 26.2 Buthanese refugees in Nepal, 1992-1993  
Diarrheal disease  22.9 22.9 
Malaria  26.0 15.5 Residents in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
2000  Diarrheal Disease  11.0 20.0 
 
E. CIVIL WAR RISK FACTORS 
As the previous section discussed, the costs and destructive influence of civil wars 
continue to accrue long after the conflict subsides.  As Collier et al. summarize: 
The country tends to get locked into persistently high levels of military 
expenditure, sees capital continuing to flow out of the country at an 
unusually high rate, and faces a much higher incidence of infectious 
disease.  Even economic policies, political institutions, and political 
freedom appear to deteriorate.54   
Consequently, the frequent legacy of civil war is a destabilized environment that fosters 
an increased risk of future civil war.   
As shown in the literature review, the magnitude of civil wars has led researchers 
across disciplines to try to understand motivations behind internal violence.  As a part of 
                                                 
52 Hazem A. Ghobarah, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After 
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53 Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, Measuring the Cost of Conflict, 14. 
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this research, scholars have analyzed the environmental conditions discussed above and 
identified specific factors that indicate a higher likelihood of factions within a state 
initiating a civil war.  The following section provides a summary of the civil war research 
and groups the findings by the primary factors that influence the return to violence.  
Appendix 2 defines the methodology used to measure the primary variables.  Appendix 3 
provides an expanded table of the variables considered in the civil war literature.  It 
includes the research consulted for this thesis, the findings for each study, and also 
groups the risk factors by primary categories. 
1. Ethnic Factors 
As illustrated in Table 2, multiple studies have found that the failure to 
successfully address ethnic factors is one of the primary reasons that post-civil war states 
fail. 
Table 2.   Ethnic Factors’ Impact on Civil War Recurrence 
  Total Significant, peace Not significant Significant, violence 
Ethnic Basis 8   2 6 
Fractionalization 4   1 3 
Dominance 2   1 2 
Polarization 2     2 
 
Analysis of the ethnicity variable provides statistical patterns that indicate when 
ethnic differences can be mobilized for violence.  Collier and Hoeffler found that 
substantial religious and ethnic diversity significantly reduces the risk of identity-based 
civil wars.  Controlling for other factors, they note that “a society is safer if it is 
composed of many such groups than if everyone has the same ethnicity and religion.”55  
In this situation, the limited population of each ethnicity in proportion to the total 
inhabitants of the state discourages the members of the ethnicity from initiating hostilities 
with other groups; each ethnicity forms a minority that by itself does not militarily 
threaten other groups.   
                                                 
55 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 563-595. 
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However, dominance by one group, polarization between competing ethnicities 
and religions, or the exclusion of significant ethnic groups from government, forebode 
dismally for the stability of a post-conflict state.56  Collier and Hoeffler found that if the 
largest group in a multi-ethnic society formed the absolute majority, the risk of rebellion 
increased by approximately 50 percent.57  Likewise, the ethnic polarization of societies 
also creates an environment prone to conflict.58   Monavlo and Reynal-Querol found that 
a completely polarized society, divided into two equal groups, has a risk of civil war six 
times higher than a homogenous society.59  Although their earlier work did not find a 
relationship, Hartzell and Hoddie’s 2003 research found that “conflicts in which parties 
are divided along ethnic lines have a 413 percent greater risk of a return to war.”60   
2. Conflict Characteristics 
Table 3 suggests that conflict intensity and conflict duration exert an inverse 
influence over the likelihood of civil war onset. 
Table 3.   Conflict Costs’ Impact on Civil War Recurrence 
  Total Significant, peace Not significant Significant, violence 
Conflict Intensity 3   1 2 
Conflict Duration 3 2 1   
 
Two of the three studies suggest that the greater the conflict intensity, the greater 
the propensity towards future violence.  Hartzell and Hoddie found that states that have 
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experienced civil wars with a relatively higher number of battle deaths in each month of 
war, measured through the intensity variable, have a greater risk of the peace failing than 
states that have emerged from a less intense domestic war.  An increase of an additional 
one thousand battle deaths per month (using a natural log transformation), leads to a 124 
percent increased likelihood of a return to civil war.61 
However, two studies also found that the longer the duration of the conflict, the 
greater the likelihood for sustained peace.  Walters found that conflict duration had a 
significant effect on whether a given country experienced multiple civil wars.  In the first 
case, longer and presumably more costly wars reduced the likelihood that a country 
would face a second, third, or fourth conflict.62 
3. Economic Factors 
In addition, Table 4 presents unanimous research findings that indicate increased 
economic development is associated with a decreased likelihood of civil war, while 
sustained poverty equates to a higher risk of violence. 
Table 4.   Economic Factors’ Impact on Civil War Recurrence 
  Total Significant, peace Not significant Significant, violence 
Development (ln) 9 9     
Poverty 5  2 3 
Natural Resources in General 8   3 5 
Oil 8   8 
 
Collier and Hoeffler found a significant negative relationship between 
development, measured as per capita income, and the probability of civil wars.  
Additionally, Henderson and Singer found that the conflict-dampening impact of 
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development, which may be barely evident in all states, is markedly evident in post-
colonial states.63  Their finding is corroborated by Auvinen, whose results from a logit 
regression utilizing the COW civil war data indicate a significant negative relationship 
between economic development and the likelihood of civil war for the 70 less-developed 
countries in his study.64 
a. Poverty 
Opportunities for rebellion can arise in environments with rampant 
poverty.  Sambanis and Hegre find a robust relationship between poverty and political 
disorder.65  This finding is supported by Collier and Hoeffler whose research suggest that 
the lower the per capita income, the greater the likelihood of civil war.  Collier and 
Hoeffler also present two competing explanations for their finding — grievance or greed.  
They reject the grievance theory, which suggests that anger develops over political 
injustice and economic inequality, and this eventually explodes into rebellion.  Instead, 
they emphasize the financial incentives that exist to initiate internal conflict.  They 
contend that in impoverished societies it is inexpensive to recruit rebel forces, and the 
recruits “costs may be related to the income foregone by enlisting as a rebel.”66  
Consequently, they conclude that rebellions are more likely when foregone income is 
unusually low.   
b. Natural Resources 
Statistically, secessionist rebellions are considerably more likely if the 
country has valuable natural resources, with oil being particularly potent.67  Natural 
resources are seldom distributed evenly through the entire state, but instead are usually 
concentrated in specific territories.  This leads to competing views of who owns the 
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resources — the state as a whole or the specific locality.  Depending on the value of the 
resources, benefits of remaining in the state, and the perceived costs in seceding, the 
inhabitants of the resource rich region have an obvious incentive to secede from the state 
and to keep the wealth for themselves.68   
To compound this difficulty, human societies almost universally attach 
locality as a part of an individual’s identify.  This tendency can become more pronounced 
during civil wars as identities become hardened as a means to distinguish individuals as a 
potential friend or adversary.  The division of society along factional lines means that 
specific factions will control previously discovered resources.  Moreover, if new 
resources are discovered, a defined group is likely to exclusively control the territory 
where they are located.69 
Consequently, rebel leaders emphasize and often exaggerate the potential 
gains from capturing control over the resources to mobilize popular support for secession 
based on identity claims.  For example, Collier et al. notes that “all ethnically 
differentiated societies have a few ethnic romantics who dream of creating an ethnically 
‘pure’ political entity”; however, the discovery of resources has the potential to “shift 
such movements from the margin of romanticism to the core agenda of economic self-
interest.”70  
Additionally, literature presenting the concept of the “rentier state” offers 
an additional explanation of the significant impact of oil.  This theory argues that because 
the funds from petroleum production flow directly into state coffers, petroleum states do 
not depend on their citizenry for public revenues or the payment of taxes.  Rather, they 
tend to rule in an arbitrary and repressive manner.  The recent examples in Venezuela and 
Nigeria suggest that even when the governments of oil states conduct elections, they 
possess the resources to corrupt the electoral process and thereby elude institutions  
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designed to induce political restraint.  Consequently, governments often engage in high 
levels of repression and often attack their own people, which, in turn, creates social 
unrest and the increases the likelihood of rebellion.71  
F. THE CIVIL WAR STATE CONCLUSION 
Civil wars have a devastating impact on both the capacity of the state and the 
populations forced to endure the violence.  Moreover, many of the destructive impacts 
continue even after the conflict has subsided.  This devastation is generally unique from 
and more intense than that experienced due to interstate conflicts.  However, the 
explosion in the level of internal violence since the conclusion of the Cold War has made 
civil war the prevalent type of conflict that exists in the world today.  Unfortunately, 
history has shown that once a state has experienced a civil war it has a much higher 
likelihood of reinitiating the conflict than a similar state that does not have a history of 
internal violence.  The international community has recognized the problem presented by 
civil wars and has developed standard strategies to implement in post-conflict states in an 
effort to help the state stabilize and remain at peace.  The following chapters will show 
how specific factors identified in this chapter significantly impact these strategies, 
provide recommendations on how the international community can account for these 
risks, and, by mitigating these risks, increase the likelihood that the post-civil war state 
will remain at peace. 
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III. DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-CIVIL WAR STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The central question of post-civil war societies remains political — how to 
construct a stable form of domestic power sharing and governance.  Although civil war 
adversaries have agreed to terminate violence, the formerly warring factions will seek 
influence in the future political system and expect public goods from the state as a peace 
dividend.  The task of international mediators is to help the parties assess the available 
forms of sharing power and help implement a political system that can help sustain the 
peace.   
1. The Benefits of Democracy 
In his 2001 review, Samuel Barnes notes that at this point in history several strong 
forces have made democracies the favored form of governance for post-conflict 
reconstruction.  He outlines numerous reasons including: 
(1) The prestige of democracy has never been higher.  Most rulers claim to 
be democrats of some genre.  Except in a few scattered marginal states, 
only democracy possesses legitimacy at the ideological level.  The 
twentieth-century struggles between alternative political and economic 
ideologies have largely subsided.  This favorable image of democracy 
is demonstrated by public opinion polls almost everywhere.72  Apart 
from a few theocracies, alternative systems possess little political or 
intellectual appeal.  Political disputes today are more likely to concern 
the definition of the community than the centrality of democracy. 
 
(2) The operating principles of democracy are familiar, even at the local 
level.  Though debate over the modalities of achieving democracy 
continues, especially in fractured societies, there is general agreement 
on the basic features of democratic participation. 
 
                                                 
72 In surveys of the 1990s, residents of 50 countries were asked to react to statements about democratic 
political systems. The statement that “democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of 
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Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 
Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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(3) Democracy is generally associated with economic well-being. Most 
successful democracies today are prosperous, and the aspiring 
democracies want to be. Generational replacement will presumably 
strengthen democracy as long as economic progress lasts-for economic 
growth is linked to globalization, and openness to private-sector 
development and information exchange, strengthening civil society.73 
 
Additionally, the democratic theorists contend that as a form of government, 
democracies are the most effective in diffusing internal conflict than other forms of 
government, a characteristic that is highly desirable in a post-civil war state.  The theory 
states that the institutions and processes of an elected form of government defuse internal 
conflict by providing opposition movements with peaceful, institutionalized means to 
pursue their interests and the opportunity to win control over and/or influence the 
government through free and fair elections.74  Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed, 
policymakers within the international community have made the establishment of a 
democratic government one of the standard practices for post-civil war states.   
2. Potential Pitfalls of Democratization 
However, Barnes also notes that democratization has a potential dark side.  He 
states that the long-term consequences of poor economic performance on new 
democracies are unknown but potent with political unrest.  Especially in post-conflict 
transitions, successful economic growth anchors the chances for democratic government.  
If democracy does not produce prosperity, at least in the medium-term, it is likely to lose 
legitimacy.75  Moreover, the countries that experienced post-World War II civil wars bear 
little resemblance to the original pioneers in the development of democracy, and they 
differ as greatly among themselves.  Some seem poorly endowed to make democracy 
work; many are economically underdeveloped; linguistically, religiously, and ethnically 
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divided; lacking in natural resources; and often deficient in economic, human, and social 
capital.  Some must also create a market economy or engage in nation building.  Despite 
these risks, Roland Paris criticizes that leaders within the international community 
continue to act on their belief that a democratic government fosters peace within a state.  
This dogmatic faith has led policymakers to unrelentingly pursue elections as a standard 
practice in peace operations, regardless of the preconditions that existed in the state prior 
to external involvement.76 
B. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter considers the cautions voiced by Barnes and Paris, and explores the 
influence that risk factors have on post-conflict democratization efforts.   The chapter has 
the following objectives from this research: (1) to consolidate and present the findings 
from these studies to determine if democratization efforts in states that have recently 
experienced a civil war have fostered durable peace; (2) to provide a summary of the 
primary civil war variables that influence the likelihood of successful democratization; 
and (3) to analyze these findings to understand the underlying issues that determine if a 
state will remain peaceful or return to violence.   
From this process, the chapter challenges the assumption that democratization is a 
panacea for post-civil war violence.  In contrast, it will demonstrate that specific factors 
that existed during the conflict have a significant influence on the potential success of the 
democratization effort.  Moreover, the research indicates that, as a whole, democratic 
reforms immediately following civil war have not fostered durable peace.  Quite the 
opposite, circumstances within the post-civil war state can create an environment where 
the contestation of power indigenous to the democratic process actually increases the 
likelihood that factions within the state will resume fighting.  Consequently, the thesis 
identifies conditions that peacebuilders should address prior to pursuing elections and 
liberal democratic reforms within the state.  Finally, the thesis concludes with 
recommendations that policymakers could consider to account for these risks and help a 
newly formed government survive the transition to a mature democracy.  As a minimum, 
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it argues that in high-risk environments, peacebuilders need to shape the environment, 
establish a minimum level of maturity in state institutions, and design an electoral process 
that promotes collaboration prior to holding elections. 
C. THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
The domestic component of the democratic peace theory is founded on the 
assumption that opposition movements need not resort to organized violence within 
democratic states because they can pursue redress of their grievances through elections.  
Moreover, the theory’s advocates suggest that elected leaders have an electoral incentive 
to accommodate the demands of aggrieved groups in order to win their votes and thereby 
enhance their own prospects of victory at the polls.  Thus, the theory establishes elections 
as the foundation that makes peace more sustainable and reduces the probability of a 
relapse into internal violence.  Consequently, the international community has made 
elections a priority in post-civil war states.   
In addition, Steven Poe and Neal Tate note that mature democracies also contain 
institutional and constitutional constraints on the state’s police power.  Thus, he argues 
these institutions limit the ability of democratic states to repress opposition movements.77  
As a result of this thesis research, the author would suggest that Poe and Tate have 
identified one of the critical, but often ignored requirements to successfully establishing a 
democratic system of government in post-conflict states.  Without established 
institutions, a government does not have the means to impartially and consistently 
address the grievances of the governed.  Additionally, in the absence of empowered 
institutions, elections alone are not sufficient in providing the safeguards needed to 
provide accountability between the regime and the governed — those in power can 
manipulate the system to maintain their grip on power.  Consequently, an elected regime 
that is not supported by effective institutions often returns to violent coercion as the 
primary means of exercising control — the government does not have the infrastructure 
required to successfully deliver public goods to their population nor does it have 
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restraints on its use of violence on its population.  As a result, we see post-conflict states 
returning to civil war after the conclusion of elections. 
D. THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
Table 5 presents the impact of a democratic form of government and democratic 
reforms on civil war onset. 
Table 5.   Government Structure’s Impact on Civil War Recurrence 
  Total Significant, peace Not significant Significant, violence 
Democratic form of government 4   2 2 
Democratic reforms 3   1 2 
 
Of four studies that analyzed the relationship between democratic governance and 
sustained peace, two found no significant impact and the other two found that a 
democratic form of government actually increased the likelihood of renewed violence.  
Specifically, Schneider and Wiesehomeier found that a presidential form of democratic 
governance increased the probability that factions within the state would reinitiate the 
conflict.78  Additionally, Henderson and Singer found that states that fail to make the 
transition to a mature democracy and get stuck as a semi-democracy also have an 
increased likelihood of returning back into civil war.79  Further, two of the three studies 
that examined the impact of democratization in the aftermath of a civil war found that the 
reforms also increased the probability of violent conflict. 
However, not all states that institute democratic reforms degenerate back into 
violent conflict.  Additionally, although government transformation increases the 
likelihood of violence, policymakers could determine that the benefits of expeditiously 
establishing a democracy within the post-conflict time period could outweigh the risks.   
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Consequently, in the governance section, the thesis identifies areas that peacebuilders 
should evaluate that directly impact the probability of democratic reforms influencing the 
state’s likelihood of regressing into renewed warfare.  
E. ANALYSIS OF RISK FACTORS 
1. Why Does Democracy Not Sustain the Peace in Post-Civil War 
Situations? 
While democracy requires the losers of a specific election to accept their defeat, it 
also implies that a group has a reasonable expectation of winning control of the 
government or forming part of a governing coalition at some point in the foreseeable 
future.  If losing parties instead conclude that they are relegated to permanent opposition 
status, the payoffs from resuming the conflict can appear more attractive than what they 
can expect to gain by accepting the status quo as the permanent minority and sustaining a 
peace that denies them the prospect of ever leading a governing coalition. 80  Under these 
circumstances, a minority may resort to actions outside the political realm to challenge 
the dominance of the majority.  The majority may then feel justified in repressing that 
minority.  An escalating cycle of repression and violence may ensue, culminating in the 
return to civil war. 
In addition, multiple strong institutions are associated with the effective 
dispersion of power.  Hartzell notes that “a number of states in which civil war has 
broken out are weakly institutionalized–a problem that is likely to be even more severe in 
the aftermath of civil war.” 81  Barnes argues that how institutions perform is critical to 
the success of post-conflict democratization.  He cautions that a new formal constitution 
does not constitute the sum total of needed institutional growth, especially in the 
aftermath of conflict.  In societies with thin institutional cultures, which are often the case 
in new democracies, actors and factions often find it easy to manipulate institutional 
instruments to their own benefit.  The absence of strong institutions encourages 
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opportunistic public and private actors to discount the future and maximize immediate 
gains.82  This unconstrained corruption destroys both the capacity and legitimacy of the 
state, and creates an incomplete transition to institutionalized democracy.  Hegre notes 
that in such states, which he labels semi-democracies, factions are required to use self-
help mechanisms to receive public goods.  These characteristics explain why semi-
democracies have a higher probability of civil war than either democracies or 
autocracies.83 
a. Ethnicity 
Schneider and Wiesehomeier found that both ethnic dominance and ethnic 
fractionalization provide the biggest challenge to a democratic country, and these ethnic 
factors combined with majoritarian voting rules make civil war much more likely. 84  
Accordingly, Schneider and Wiesehomeier find that the greater the number of political 
parties the lower the risk of renewed conflict, with a minimum of four parties needed to 
achieve the threshold.85  Additionally, Papaioannou and Siourounis contend that religious 
fractionalization hinders democratization in the first place.86 
The hardening of identities and the potential of creating a permanent 
minority are especially prevalent features of ethnic civil wars that exacerbate the 
difficulties in establishing a stable post-conflict state.  Chaim Kaufman explains that: 
The difference is the flexibility of individual loyalties, which are quite 
fluid in ideological conflicts, but almost completely rigid in ethnic 
wars….War hardens ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political 
appeals become futile….Ethnic wars also generate intense security 
dilemmas, both because the escalation of each side’s mobilization rhetoric  
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presents a real threat to the other, and even more because intermingled 
population settlement patterns create defensive vulnerabilities and 
offensive opportunities.87 
Ethnic civil wars differ from ideologically based civil wars when the 
benefits of victory are more indivisible.  Accordingly, Hegre found that ethnically based 
civil wars are roughly twice as likely to recur as those that are not ethnically based.88 
Further, Wantchekon and Neeman’s findings imply that the heterogeneity 
of the electorate is a necessary condition for a democratic enforcement mechanism to 
emerge.89  This agrees with Lijphart’s observation that societies in which the primary 
cleavage is ethnicity and that contain very few ethnic groups are less likely to 
democratize than those divided along numerous ethnic groups or those with cross-cutting 
cleavages.90  The results imply that democracy will persist as long as elections remain 
competitive.  However, unless the electorate is heterogeneous, competing factions will 
not develop that have a reasonably high likelihood of winning democratic elections.  
Conversely, if coalitions harden or if one coalition becomes too small, it will defect and 
democracy will collapse. 
Consequently, political participation is often not a sufficient remedy to 
solve the internal tensions of ethnically divided countries.91  In contrast, under some 
circumstances democratic competition can exacerbate ethnic conflict.  Jack Snyder 
argues that democratization exacerbates ethnic violence by tempting politicians to “play 
the ethnic card” in order to avoid challenges and consolidate their rule.92  This line  
of argument is continued by Donald Horowitz, who observes that ethnic divisions  
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have become salient with groups mobilized in exclusive ethnic groups to conduct 
violence against another ethnicity during the civil war. 
As a result, political parties form along ethnic lines, which make the 
consolidation of democracy problematic.  Efforts by party leaders to form coalitions 
across ethnic lines or attempts to forge multiethnic parties leave moderate leaders 
vulnerable to challenges from extremists within their own ethnic group.  Political 
candidates who make appeals across ethnic lines lose more votes by challengers who 
stoke fears within their own ethnic group by playing “the ethnic card” than they can gain 
from other ethnicities.  With an ethnically based party system, elections can denigrate 
into little more than an ethnic census. 93  Minorities become vulnerable to the tyranny of 
the ethnic majority unless institutional protections are established both on paper in the 
constitution and in practice. 
b. Conflict Intensity 
Hartzell and Hoddie hypothesize that the importance of this variable is 
attributable to security concerns: the higher the casualty rate and the greater the sunk 
costs, the more concerned groups will be about their safety.94  Democratic competition 
requires a minimal degree of trust in your adversaries.  However, Hartzell and Hodie state 
that “wars with high human costs are likely to produce pronounced feelings of insecurity, 
very low levels of trust, and deep concern about the future.”95  As a result, the factions 
will have more difficulty trusting the opposition and committing to peaceful democratic 
competition.  These concerns mean that former adversaries will have limited enthusiasm 
for cooperating in the interest of managing future conflict.  Participants in the settlement 
may also be more prone to interpret the behaviors of their former adversaries as hostile 
and thus be predisposed to a return to conflict. 
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c. Economic Development 
Collier’s finding of underdevelopment as a primary precipitant of civil war 
suggests that democratization of high risk states requires a multi-faceted conflict 
prevention strategy that also focuses on development.  The failure to adopt a 
comprehensive approach can lead to policies where the actions taken to alleviate 
problems related to one class of factors (i.e., economic development) exacerbate 
difficulties related to other factors (i.e., political stability).  Often post-civil war states 
turn to international organizations for assistance in economic development and 
stabilization.  However, Auvinen’s analysis of 70 less developed states from 1981 to 
1989 implicated the International Monetary Fund’s high-conditionality structural-
adjustment programs in generating so much political instability that the programs created 
worse political and sometimes economic conditions within the state than they had 
experienced without them.96  The failure of the international community to consider these 
inter-relationships has contributed to the suffering of the state’s population, which in turn 
spawns domestic conflict during a period when a newly established government has 
limited capacity and is highly vulnerable to collapse. 
Hegre & Sambanis provide an example of these inter-relationships; they 
explain that wealthier countries have more resources at their disposition for investment in 
social insurance and other forms of redistribution with the aim to alleviate social 
tensions.97  Additionally, Collier & Hoeffler note that highly developed countries have a 
much broader tax base than developing economies, which contributes to increased state 
capacity to address factors that could lead to civil war (i.e., the ability to provide a social 
safety net to underprivileged minorities and increased coercive capacity to counter 
violent opposition to the government).98   
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F. DEMOCRATIZATION CONCLUSION 
Democratization does not provide a panacea for peace in post-conflict states.  In 
contrast, the competition that occurs through the democratic contestation of power creates 
parties organized according to the factions that existed during the conflict.  The 
contestation between these factions during elections can increase the likelihood of 
renewed violence in states that have undergone ethnic or intense conflict.  In addition, 
extremist leaders typically hold more influence than moderate leaders in a post-conflict 
environment.  By using rhetoric that presents the opposition parties as threats and appeals 
to common identity features such as ethnicity, extremist politicians can motivate their 
constituency through fear and paint moderates as weak or as agents of the opposition. 
Finally, democratization can also increase the probability of renewed violence if 
the implementation of democratic reforms creates groups that become a permanent 
minority or brings inequitable distribution of public goods.  In an environment with 
parties determined by unchanging identity features such as ethnicity, a minority party has 
no chance of gaining power.  As a consequence, the majority party can relegate the 
minority to the sidelines of power and implement policies that discriminate against the 
minority population.  The weakness of institutions in post-civil war states also contributes 
to this situation; for example, an ethnic majority can gain control of the nascent 
institutions and use them to reinforce their power and the distribution of public goods to 
their faction. 
Consequently, peacebuilders must appraise the conditions that exist within a state 
in order to identify the risk factors that could sabotage the possibility of sustained peace 
and future mature democracy.  The presence of these variables would suggest that 
implementation of democratization programs could severely destabilize a state.  
However, this does not mean that governance changes cannot be pursued; the final 
chapter of this thesis will provide recommendations on how to mitigate the risks that exist 
because of these variables.   
 40
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IV. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN POST-CIVIL WAR 
STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction — governance and participation, 
security, justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being — are all 
inextricably linked, and a positive outcome in each area depends on successful 
integration and interaction across them.  None-the-less, security “is the foundation on 
which progress in the other issue areas rests.”99  Security encompasses the provision of 
collective and individual security to the citizenry and to the assistors.  However, post-
conflict situations, by definition, have at their core a significant security vacuum that is 
often the proximate cause for external intervention.  Indigenous security institutions are 
either unable to provide security or are operating outside generally accepted norms.  
Consequently, tens of thousands of international military personnel are deployed across 
the globe in peacekeeping operations authorized for the purpose of filling the security 
vacuum left in post-civil war states.100   
1. The Rise in Peacekeeping Missions 
In 2008, the United Nations approved a 7.3 billion dollar peacekeeping budget — 
the largest peacekeeping budget in the organization’s history — that will field 90,000 
uniformed personnel for operations across the globe.  In terms of both money and 
personnel, this represents a ten percent increase from the previous year and close to a 
threefold increase since 2003.  “In perspective, the peacekeeping budget is now three 
times as high as non-military expenditure by the UN.”101 
This increase represents a second surge in UN peacekeeping missions over the 
past decade.  During the Cold War, rivalry between the superpowers limited the UN’s 
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ability to coordinate an international response to conflicts.  However, after the Soviet 
collapse, the UN saw its role reenergized and peacekeeping missions in the 1990s surged, 
with missions authorized for conflicts in Cambodia, Somalia, the Balkans, and elsewhere.  
Nonetheless, the UN’s ability to conduct peacekeeping missions did not live up to 
expectations, and failures in the mid-1990s caused the UN member states to withhold 
support for future missions.102  This changed when the 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States illuminated the reality that instability within distant states can translate to 
tragedy at home.  Consequently, the UN has once again become the default organization 
to respond to the conflicts simmering in many parts of the world. 
2. Opposing Views on the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Missions 
There are both opponents and advocates to the latest resurgence in UN 
peacekeeping missions.103  Opponents such as Trevor Findlay argue that the failure of 
UN peacekeeping missions undertaken in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone 
indicate that the UN cannot adequately undertake complex peacekeeping missions.  He 
argues that “the use of force by UN peacekeepers has been marked by political 
controversy, doctrinal vacuousness, conceptual confusion, and failure in the field,” and 
the UN has lost its moral imperative due to the gross human rights violations conducted 
by UN peacekeepers.104  In contrast, proponents of peacekeeping argue that the failures, 
while dramatic, are the exception, and UN peacekeeping missions are a critical tool for 
securing the peace in post-conflict states.  For example, Scott Feil argues that when 
United States military personnel have been involved in these operations “the record 
shows that successes outweigh failures.”  Moreover, he emphasizes that because of  
peacekeeping operations “people stop killing, and many more stop dying” making the 
operations “the difference between life and death for hundreds of thousands of 
people.”105 
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B. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In truth, both camps can point to examples and both are prone to selection bias as 
they argue in support of their position.  However, a problem occurs in that the examples 
only include cases where peacekeeping missions have deployed and do not consider how 
the results compare to similar situations where the warring parties have been left to their 
own devices.  This chapter explores a similar question to the one presented by many of 
these authors: “Do UN peacekeeping operations contribute to securing a sustained peace 
in post-civil war states?”  In addition, it also explores how the risk factors prevalent in the 
conflict influence the peacekeeping mission.   
To answer these questions, this chapter analyzes empirical data on how effective 
peacekeeping missions are in securing lasting peace in post-conflict states. Additionally, 
within these cases it looks for data trends that indicate how ethnicity, conflict intensity, 
and economic development impact the missions.  This chapter will demonstrate that 
specific types of UN peacekeeping missions have a significant positive impact on the 
probability of post-civil war states sustaining peace.  However, these risk factors negate 
the effectiveness of traditional peacekeeping missions.  Consequently, before authorizing 
the mission, policymakers should examine the situation to discern if these risk factors are 
present and execute a type of peacekeeping mission capable of mitigating these risks.  By 
adjusting the level of resources and technical capability to the specific environment, 
multidimensional peacekeeping missions effectively assist states recovering from civil 
wars and secure lasting peace.   
This chapter has six remaining sections: (1) a background on UN peacekeeping 
missions, (2) peacekeeping objectives, (3) findings from previous research, (4) the impact 
of peacekeeping, (5) analysis of risk factors, and (6) the conclusion. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The UN launched its first peacekeeping mission in 1948, when the Security 
Council authorized UN military observers to monitor the Armistice Agreement between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors.  Since this first mission, the UN has undertaken 63 
peacekeeping missions throughout the world and has rapidly escalated the number of 
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missions since the conclusion of the Cold War.106  In 1988, six UN peacekeeping 
operations existed; however, the number of active operations jumped to 17 in 1993 and 
has never dropped below 15 as of 2008.107  The Security Council mandated some forty-
five peacekeeping missions from 1988 to 2004, compared with just thirteen from 1948 to 
1987 (see Figure 3 for a graph of UN peacekeeping operations).108 
Figure 3.   UN peacekeeping operations and civil wars (From: International Security)109 
 
In addition to an increased number of operations, the nature of conflicts has also 
changed over the past two decades.  During the Cold War, peacekeepers were introduced 
in the aftermath of interstate conflicts after the involved states agreed to a cease-fire and 
provided consent for a UN mission.  More recently, however, peacekeepers are inserted 
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into intrastate conflicts while violence is still active and without the consent (and 
sometimes against the will) of warring factions.110  In the Cold War era, the UN only 
deployed four peacekeeping missions (approximately 30 percent) to conflicts that 
included civil disputes.111  However, beginning with the 1989 mission to Namibia 
(UNTAG), more than 90 percent of peace operations have involved civil conflict.  
Moreover, in a number of cases, the deployment was to states with exclusively internal 
violence.112 
This dramatic change in the strategic context of peacekeeping missions has 
caused the UN to expand its operations from “traditional” missions that primarily 
involved military functions, to complex “multidimensional” missions that include the 
expertise needed to implement the diverse tasks contained in peace agreements.113  
Although the military remains the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations comprise a broad range of complex activities 
and involve many more civilian functions.114  Now, among other duties, military 
peacekeepers may seize weapons, clear land mines, train security personnel, and protect 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance.  Peacekeeping operations also involve more 
civilian tasks such as repatriating refugees, rebuilding physical infrastructure, 
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maintaining law and order, monitoring and training police, and civilian administration, 
election monitoring, and human rights monitoring.115 
Mullenbach notes that these peacebuilding activities can be “categorized into five 
dimensions: economic, humanitarian, legal, military, and political.”  Each of these 
dimensions includes a set of specific external actor activities that have the “overall goal 
of meeting the ‘basic needs’ of society, preventing military hostilities, and facilitating the 
peaceful settlement of an intrastate dispute.”116  Mullenback and Fortna both summarize 
that the main intent behind third-party peacebuilding efforts is to help lay the foundation 
for a sustainable and stable peace.117 
D. PEACEKEEPING OBJECTIVES 
Doyle notes that civil wars occur when individuals, groups, and factions within a 
society decide that the security services, judiciary, or politicians no longer act on their 
behalf.  The “local cop on the beat,” becomes the “Croatian, Serb, or Muslim cop.”  
When the “disaffected mobilize, acquire the resources needed to risk an armed contest, 
and judge that they can win, civil war follows.”118  Just as civil wars usually involve a 
failure of legitimate state authority, sustainable peace relies on its successful restoration.  
Accordingly, in An Agenda for Peace, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
developed the concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding,” and defined it as “action to 
identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order 
to avoid a relapse into conflict.”119  Hence, peacekeeping missions aim to provide the 
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space and conduct actions that will allow the state to establish legitimate and functioning 
state institutions that act impartially on behalf of its citizens. 
Thus, peacekeeping advocates contend that establishing peace requires addressing 
the factors that lead factions to mobilize towards violence.  The most common issue is the 
“security dilemma” that arises between groups within the state.  In the absence of a 
central state authority that can provide security, each faction attempts to secure arms for 
protection.  However, as in an arms race between states, increased weaponry for one 
faction makes the other groups vulnerable to attack and in need of increased 
armaments.120 
The theory implies that peacekeepers can step in as a neutral third party and break 
this cycle.  By providing security and committing to enforce the terms of the peace 
agreement, peacekeepers remove the threat of attack by former adversaries and externally 
secure the terms of the agreement.  With the incentives to maintain military capacity 
removed, factions can demobilize their combatants.  Joanna Spear argues that it is the 
demobilization of combatants that fosters the security required to successfully implement 
a peace agreement.  Lacking security on the ground, “there cannot be deep 
implementation of such an agreement; for example, the holding of elections, 
reempowerment of civil society, establishment of political accountability, and 
redevelopment of the economy.”121 
E. FINDINGS FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
However, do UN peacekeeping missions accomplish what is suggested in theory?  
Do UN intercessions chartered to help sustain the peace in post-civil war states help 
create a more stable peace?  Different researchers on this topic have arrived to a number 
of conflicting conclusions.  For example, on one spectrum Hartzell, Hoddie, and 
Rothchild found third-party involvement was an important factor that substantially 
                                                 
120 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace 
Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 28. 
121 Joanna Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization” In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of 
Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141. 
 48
increased the likelihood of a sustained peace.122  In their 2000 study, Doyle and 
Sambanis offered the more restrained finding that “multilateral, United Nations peace 
operations make a positive difference.”123  Finally, on the opposite end of the spectrum, 
Amitabh Dubey’s study using Doyle and Sambanis’ dataset found that external 
peacekeeping missions do not increase the likelihood of achieving a sustained peace.124 
F. THE IMPACT OF PEACEKEEPING 
Each of the studies found that peacekeeping can reduce the likelihood of civil 
war.  However, the researchers found different levels of effectiveness.  Fortna found a 
significant influence from all types of peacekeeping missions, while Doyle, Sambanis, 
and Mullenbach found that multidimensional peacekeeping had the most significant 
impact on a state securing peace. 
Fortna found a 32 percent reduction in the risk of renewed conflict for UN 
peacekeeping operations in the post-WWII period.  Moreover, at the end of the Cold War 
the positive effect of peacekeeping on peace is more significant. She notes, “Across 
similar states, when the international community deploys peacekeepers the risk of another 
round of fighting drops by almost 70 percent.”  She found that UN peacekeeping 
missions had a smaller impact than missions led by other organizations, with a 50 percent 
reduction in the risk of renewed violence versus a 70 percent reduction.  However, due to 
the limited number of cases, this finding falls short of the 10 percent statistical 
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significance threshold (p = .12).125  Later, this chapter will discuss how the level of 
violence occurring in the state plays a role in the type of international intervention that 
will be effective. 
Fortna’s findings are important because they use the same stringent criteria for 
peacekeeping success that led Dubey to determine that peacekeeping did not have a 
significant impact on the sustainability of peace (see footnote 125).  However, even with 
this more rigorous standard, she found that peacekeeping has a significant impact 
(especially post-Cold War) on the likelihood of achieving a sustained peace. 
Doyle and Sambanis found that UN missions had a high significance, but the type 
of UN mission had a substantial impact on the mission’s effectiveness.  They found that 
traditional peacekeeping could help achieve sovereign peace but had a negative influence 
on securing a self-sustaining peace.  Moreover, traditional peacekeeping was not 
effective in difficult environments.  In permissive environments, they suggest that 
observer missions had a higher positive impact on both sovereign and participatory peace 
than traditional peacekeeping missions.  Finally, they found that a multidimensional 
peacekeeping mission increases the probability of a state achieving sovereign peace by an 
average of 52 percent and participatory peace by an average of 36 percent.126  
Mullenbach found that states with multidimensional peacekeeping missions were 
26 percent less likely to escalate into military hostilities within five years of the post-civil 
war peace than states that did not receive a multidimensional peacekeeping mission (20 
percent versus 46 percent, respectively).127  Additionally, he found that 33 percent of 
post-conflict states that received multidimensional peacekeepers implemented the terms 
of the peace agreement within a five-year time span versus only 13 percent of the cases 
that did not.  Mullenbach provides a final important observation when he notes that 40  
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percent of states with traditional peacekeeping missions returned to internal violence 
within five years compared to the 20 percent noted above for multidimensional 
peacekeeping missions.128 
G. ANALYSIS OF RISK FACTORS 
Although UN peacekeeping missions provide a positive influence on a state’s 
ability to maintain the peace, additional data points lie within these general findings that 
demonstrate the impact of civil war risk factors on a specific mission’s effectiveness.  
The introduction of risk factors helps explain why traditional peacekeeping missions have 
limited effectiveness.  Additionally, the identification of specific factors can help 
peacebuilders implement the required force composition for multidimensional missions. 
1. Ethnicity 
The risk indicators suggest that ethnic conflicts indicate a more difficult 
environment for peace operations.  The data supports this hypothesis and ethnically 
influenced conflicts are “highly significant and are negatively correlated” with 
peacebuilding success, and it has a more significant impact on participatory peace than on 
sovereign peace.129  UN peacekeeping operations have the ability to address the low-level 
violence that occurs after a civil war to enable countries to rebuild institutions and 
democratize.  However, they do not have the military capacity needed to end conflicts or 
prevent the resumption of full-scale civil war between the combatants.   
This is a severe limitation because ethnically motivated conflicts contain many 
characteristics that can rapidly denigrate to full-scale war.  First, ethnically based wars 
rarely solve the core injustices that initiated the conflict and violence often continues 
after the factions agree to peace.  In addition, ethnically motivated passions can lead to 
rapidly escalating tensions.  Moreover, ethnic lines create a natural channel to spread 
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hostility and can be so intense that they mobilize the ethnic group to war.  Further, the 
hardened identity of ethnicity and fairly easy identification creates additional tension that 
increases the difficulty of post-conflict reconciliation between factions that were 
previously adversaries.130    
2. Conflict Intensity 
The risk indicators would suggest a lower probability of peacekeeping success 
with increased conflict intensity.  The findings support this theory; higher conflict 
intensities produced increased levels of postwar hostility.  Consequently, “human misery 
created by the war is negatively and significantly associated with peacebuilding 
success.”131  However, the findings suggest that the number of total deaths by itself does 
not sufficiently impact peacekeeping success; instead, a combination of total deaths and 
displacements merge (per capita deaths and displacements) to substantially impact the 
volatility of the peacekeeping environment.   
In this situation, the peace during the period immediately after a conflict is 
extremely tenuous.132  The intense level of violence that occurred during the conflict 
creates an explosive combination of hatred and fear that destabilizes the post-conflict 
environment.  As Stedman summarizes, “Far from being a time of conflict reduction,” the 
period immediately after concluding the conflict is “fraught with risk, uncertainty, and 
vulnerability for the warring parties and civilians caught in between.”133  Consequently, 
peace intervention must happen quickly to have the best chance of success. 
3. Shared Characteristics of Ethnicity and Conflict Intensity 
One of the most important realizations is the difference in effectiveness between 
traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping missions in post-conflict states that were 
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exposed to ethnic or high-conflict intensity risk factors.134  It is important to note that the 
UN has acted on this observation.  After the peacekeeping failures in the 1990s, the 
organization assessed its peacekeeping assumptions, requirements, and operating 
procedures and made reforms to address many of the deficiencies it found.  This 
transformation process is what led to the concept of multidimensional peacekeeping.  
Although more expensive in numbers of personnel and financial costs, the added capacity 
brought by multidimensional peacekeeping has shown to dramatically increase the UN’s 
ability to rebuild a war torn society and reestablish the institutions needed for a sustained 
peace. 
Nonetheless, while UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions are the most 
effective means for international intervention in a peacekeeping situation, UN led 
missions are not effective in stopping ongoing violence.  The mere presence of a UN 
mission (regardless of the mandate type) does not have a significant short-term affect on 
whether the parties will resume conflict.  Even for multidimensional peacekeeping, the 
mission’s impact on preventing conflict recurrence increases over the longer term as the 
positive impacts of institutional reconstruction influence the factions’ preference between 
war and peace. 135  
This gives credence to both Marten and Wilson’s argument that stopping a 
conflict between determined combatants requires intervention by militarily capable 
“interested states that have the will and resources to see them through difficult times.  
Without that kind of strong state support, outside intervention is often no match for the 
spoilers.136  Regional organizations and “coalitions” of the willing can both effectively 
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conduct peace enforcement missions, as both can have more military capability than the 
UN.  When authorizing a course of action the international community should weigh the 
benefits of increased military capacity versus the illegitimacy that occurs when the 
intervening force is dominated by a single powerful state.  However; the overriding 
determinant of success comes down to a militarily powerful state that has vital interests at 
stake leading the operation.137 
4. Economic Development 
Two different theories are addressed within economic development.  The first is 
that an initially high level of economic development should indicate a higher probability 
of peacekeeping success.  More developed economies with established infrastructure and 
lower levels of poverty should have a higher capacity for rebuilding after civil war and be 
less susceptible to war recurrence due to lack of economic opportunity.  However, 
analysis of the data does not support this theory; a high level of economic development 
does not reduce the risk of renewed conflict.   Peacekeeping forces should not assume 
that the presence of economic capacity will translate to a content population (indeed, if 
this was the case the state would not have instigated the civil war to start).  A state can 
have a high level of economic development and still have economic inequality, repressive 
governmental institutions, and ethnic fractionalization.   
The second theory is that after a civil war, economic growth can help mitigate 
war-generated hostility, as a growing economy addresses previously existing economic 
grievances and offers incentives for people to avoid another war.  In contrast to the level 
of economic development, economic growth has an important effect on short-term 
mitigation of civil war risks.  The data suggests that rapid economic growth can 
compensate for a weak peacekeeping force and reduces the risk of conflict recurrence in 
the period immediately following a conflict.  Additionally, the data suggests that this 
impact is most effective when the economic growth occurs locally.  Thus, even a thinly 
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dispersed peacekeeping force that has the ability to sponsor small-scale economic growth 
projects that develop local capacities are “crucial predictors” of achieving stability.138 
The presence of valuable natural resources can compound the difficulty of a 
peacekeeping mission.  If natural resources are located in only a portion of the state, 
competing views over the control and the distribution of the profits from those resources 
create a minefield of issues that can escalate into confrontation.  Human societies almost 
universally attach locality as a part of an individual’s identify.  This tendency can become 
more pronounced during civil wars as identities become hardened as a means to identify 
individuals as potential friends or adversaries.  The division of society along factional 
lines means that specific factions will control previously discovered resources.  
Moreover, if new resources are discovered, a defined group is likely to exclusively 
control the territory where they are located.139 
Consequently, rebel leaders emphasize and often exaggerate the potential gains 
from capturing control over the resources to mobilize popular support for secession based 
on identity claims.  For example, Collier et al. notes that “all ethnically differentiated 
societies have a few ethnic romantics who dream of creating an ethnically ‘pure’ political 
entity;” however, the discovery of resources has the potential to “shift such movements 
from the margin of romanticism to the core agenda of economic self-interest.”140  If not 
addressed, the secessionist rhetoric can undermine the peacekeeper’s efforts to de-
escalate tensions and stabilize the state. 
A second way that commodities can challenge the peacekeeping mission is 
through the direct funding of rebel forces.  However, this not only occurs with established 
rebel groups that already control resources, but may also happen when small rebel forces 
raise finances by selling the future rights to war booty.  For example, in the Congo  
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private militias raised 150 million dollars by selling future exploitation rights to oil 
reserves; funds that were critical in building a military force capable of initiating the 1997 
civil war.141 
H. PEACEKEEPING CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, it is up to the parties involved in the civil war to make the decisions 
and commitments necessary to bring peace to war-torn societies, but UN peacekeeping 
missions play an instrumental role in helping a willing society overcome the obstacles 
that can prevent their state from establishing peace.  The security provided by 
peacekeepers creates an environment that permits the other elements of domestic society 
and the international community to conduct the actions needed to stabilize the state.   
However, in the presence of militant leaders who have not abandoned violence, 
the introduction of peacekeepers alone is not sufficient to guarantee security.  This 
creates a significant vulnerability for peacekeeping missions, as entrenched militant 
leaders can use ethnic identity or the hatred brought by massive displacement to rekindle 
the motivations for war.  This weakness was powerfully demonstrated by the failure of 
traditional peacekeeping missions.  They emphasized impartiality and observation, and 
consequently did not have the means or the mandate to confront actors that threatened the 
peace process. 
The international community has acted on previous shortfalls, and today’s 
multidimensional peacekeeping missions actively attempt to implement a new power 
structure within the post-civil war state.  Since this threatens former powerbrokers within 
the state that have traditionally held power by force, peacekeeping missions must have 
the capacity to establish enough of a presence to suppress militant leaders that are 
challenging the international community.   
Accordingly, it is also important to acknowledge the means by which militant 
leaders can destabilize the peacekeeping process.  Rebel control of natural resources 
should provide policymakers an acute warning of probable militant resistance to the 
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peacekeeping mission.  First, natural resources or the prospect of future wealth provides 
warlords with the means to finance military operations.  Additionally, natural resources 
create a patronage network where specific factions control and distribute the proceeds 
gained from the resources.  Both of these situations create numerous challenges to the 
peacekeeping mission. 
These limitations necessitate that peacekeeping missions expand their influence in 
more areas than just security.  Although a gap exists in the UN’s ability to influence the 
likelihood of peace in the period immediately following the end of the conflict, these 
findings suggest that multidimensional peacekeeping missions can provide one of the 
most effective means to bring progress across multiple fronts and help secure a lasting 
peace to post-civil war states.  Further capacity that disrupts the ability of hostile actors to 
act as spoilers would be the next step in increasing their effectiveness.   
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V. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POST-CIVIL WAR STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With few exceptions, conflict-ridden countries are among the least developed.  
Since 1990, “80 percent of the world’s 20 poorest countries have suffered a major armed 
conflict.”142  Additionally, of the “39 states that are currently considered to be conflict-
affected, 30 are among the world’s poorest.”143  In the often cited Collier and Hoeffler 
economic model of civil war, the authors argue that it is not “political and social 
grievances per se that leads to civil war, but rather, for given levels of grievance, it is the 
opportunity to organize and finance a rebellion that determines if a civil war will occur or 
not.”144  According to this model, the determinants of an escalation to violence are 
primarily economic, and there are specific conditions that make rebellion financially 
viable. 
In view of this, it is not surprising that economic development provides one of the 
most powerful indicators of whether a post-civil war state will return to violence or 
sustain the peace.  However, many post-civil war states are locked in a vicious circle 
where poverty causes conflict and conflict causes poverty.  Low-income countries have 
severe institutional and capacity problems.  Basic infrastructure such as schools, homes, 
industry, communications networks, and transportation infrastructure has been destroyed.  
The currency is often devalued.  Institutions are weak and corrupt with dysfunctional 
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infrastructural and institutional weaknesses hamper economic growth, and, consequently, 
invite internal strife.  Yet, in turn, civil wars are the “main obstacle to development and 
poverty reduction in many countries.”146 
The international community has recognized the importance of economic 
development in securing the peace, and the World Bank alone distributes over 20 billion 
dollars in economic aid to post-conflict states.  However, post-conflict reconstruction aid 
is a unique form of developmental assistance that entails specific challenges due to its 
two objectives: (1) meeting immediate needs that typically include humanitarian 
assistance and other forms of relief assistance; and (2) rebuilding the physical and 
institutional infrastructure required to support long-term economic development.  Martin 
Weiss notes that while the “goals of relief and development are not inherently 
incompatible, effectively distributing resources that balance these short and long-term 
goals is potentially the most difficult challenge for post-conflict aid.”147   
These competing goals can lead to incongruent policies that not only undermine 
the efforts of the other, but that are removed from the objectives of the peace process and 
can destabilize the targeted state.  In order to help understand how economic issues 
correlate to civil war violence, this chapter has five following sections that explore (1) the 
relationship between economic development and civil war onset, (2) traditional 
development strategies, (3) problems in the traditional approaches, (4) the impact of risk 
factors, and (5) conclusion.  
B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL WAR ONSET 
1. Research Findings 
After compiling civil war risk indicators, the author found that every study that 
included economic development as a variable unanimously found a significant 
relationship that indicates increased economic development is associated with a 
decreased likelihood of civil war.  Of note from these studies, in their 1997 research 
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Collier & Hoeffler found a significant negative relationship between development, 
measured as per capita income, and the probability of civil wars.  Collier et al. continued 
to develop this in their 2005 study where they note that increasing per capita income is 
highly significant in reducing the likelihood of renewed civil war.148  Additionally, 
Henderson and Singer found that the conflict-dampening impact of development, which 
may be barely evident in all states, is markedly evident in post-colonial states.149  Their 
finding is corroborated by Auvinen, whose results from a logit regression using the 
Correlates of War (COW) civil war database indicate a significant negative relationship 
between economic development and the likelihood of civil war for the 70 less-developed 
countries in his study.150  Auvinen also noted that post-civil war states often turn to 
international organizations for assistance in economic development and stabilization.  
However, his analysis implicated that the International Monetary Fund’s conditionality 
structural-adjustment programs generated so much political instability that the programs 
often created worse political and economic conditions within the state after their 
implementation than what was experienced without them.151   
In a more comprehensive 2008 study, Collier, Hoefler, and Soderbom reconfirm 
their earlier findings: “Income matters: it is highly significant and the effect is large.”  
Their study found if the economy remains stagnant through the decade following a civil 
war, the state has a 42 percent mean risk of renewed violence.  However, their research 
found that if the initial level of income is twice the mean and all other characteristics are 
held constant, then the risk falls to 31 percent.  Additionally, they found that if the state’s 
economy grows at 10 percent per year the risk falls to 27 percent.152   
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2. Research Analysis 
These findings have three important implications.  First, the risks are considerably 
higher in low-income countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and East 
Timor are all much more alarming situations than Bosnia, other things being equal.  
Second, economic performance during the first decade after conflict is likely to matter, if 
only because higher income will bring risks down.  Finally, Auvinen’s findings suggest 
that high risk states require a multi-faceted approach that couples the macro focus of the 
IMF’s structural adjustment programs with micro level developmental programs that 
foster political stability.  The failure to adopt a comprehensive approach can lead to 
policies where the actions taken to alleviate problems related to one class of factors (i.e., 
economic solvency) exacerbate difficulties related to other factors (i.e., political 
stability). 
Hegre & Sambanis provide an example of these inter-relationships when they 
explain that wealthier countries have more resources at their disposition that could be 
invested in social insurance and other forms of redistribution with the aim to alleviate 
social tensions.153  Additionally, Collier & Hoeffler note that highly developed countries 
have a much broader tax base than developing economies, which contributes to increased 
state capacity to address factors that could lead to civil war (i.e., the ability to provide a 
social safety net to underprivileged minorities and increased coercive capacity to counter 
violent opposition to the government).154  However, if Auvinen’s conclusions are correct, 
the failure of the international community to consider these inter-relationships has 
contributed to the suffering of the post-civil war state’s population, which in turn has 
spawned domestic conflict during a period when a newly established government has 
limited capacity and is highly vulnerable to collapse. 
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C. TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
1. Background 
Until the second half of the 1990s, donors responded to the economic needs of 
post-civil war states with long-established programmatic approaches developed for other 
circumstances.  The tasks were divided into two categories: relief and development.  
Humanitarian organizations or emergency response divisions of development agencies 
provided relief, while bilateral and multilateral development agencies focused on 
development.  These two aid strategies are based on different economic models: the 
natural disaster model for crisis relief, and the post-war stabilization and reconstruction 
model for development.155 
2. The Natural Disaster Model 
The natural disaster model provides the conceptual framework for most post-civil 
war assistance in the first two years, as it does for most humanitarian assistance and 
emergency relief during wartime.  The focus of this model is on meeting the populations’ 
basic needs by the fastest means possible, which typically entails the direct delivery of 
goods and services.  Due to the immediate severity of the populations’ critical needs, 
longer-term development programming is considered a second stage activity. 156 
Thus, although relief organizations are equipped to respond rapidly and are often 
directly knowledgeable about the local conditions and the immediate needs of the 
population, humanitarian workers nonetheless have a short-term approach.  
Unfortunately, once the aid agencies gain a vested interest in the program’s continuation, 
they often continue to use this approach beyond the initial crisis response.157  This 
tendency has become a reoccurring problem cited numerously by World Bank officials 
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with Sven Sandstrom, the World Bank’s managing director, stating that “in the transition 
from relief to development, too much time has been spent in the relief phase.”158 
3. The Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction Model 
The post-war stabilization and reconstruction model is a neoliberal economic 
strategy emanating from the international financial institutions (IFIs), particularly from 
the World Bank and IMF.  The World Bank’s Articles of agreement include the specified 
purposes of “the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war” and the 
“reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs.”159  The IMF focuses on 
producing macroeconomic conditions that will increase foreign investors’ confidence in a 
country’s economic prospects.160 
The IFIs use a two-pronged strategy of macroeconomic stabilization and 
structural adjustment.  The process begins with an IMF program that provides credit to 
the country’s special drawing rights account at the IMF.  However, this credit is 
conditional and offered to support the completion of stabilization measures based on the 
orthodox deflationary principles of monetary and fiscal restraint.  The IMF phase is 
followed by sovereign loans mobilized from donors by the World Bank for projects 
designed to promote macroeconomic growth and attract foreign investment.  Typically, 
these funds are designated to support Bank designated large-scale physical infrastructure 
construction projects, to reform economic institutions, and to institute policies that 
promote liberalization and privatization.161 
The IMF traditionally places priority on macroeconomic stability, both as the first 
task of economic policy and as the context from which all other aid and policy takes 
place.  Consequently, the inflexibility of its stabilization model has been frequently 
criticized as being in conflict with the goals of social peace and reconciliation.162  
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Moreover, experiences during the growing number of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping 
missions that occurred during the 1990s led to the recognition that a gap exists between 
the assistance provided through the natural disaster model and the postwar stabilization 
and reconstruction model. 
D. PROBLEMS IN THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES 
1. Limitations of the Natural Disaster Model 
Sustained relief activity in the form of donations and support for unviable 
livelihood activities can intensify the negative economic impact that occurs due to civil 
war.  These interventions, while critical to meeting short-term human needs, distort the 
private economic sector.  Eliminating relief delivery distortions is impossible; however, 
by not accounting for the impact on the local market many relief programs exacerbate the 
problem.  In their 2006 study on relief programs, Tracy Gerstle and Timothy Nourse 
found multiple conditions that foster this neglect, to include:  
1. The practical difficulties of identifying legitimate businesses and 
entrepreneurs and designing programs that utilize them effectively in a chaotic 
and pressured situation. 
2. Relief programs’ inherent nature and their objective to address conflict-
affected populations’ immediate needs.  This focus on a conflict’s symptoms 
rather than causes, and the need for expediency, creates an “emergency 
mindset,” impeding in-depth analysis.  
3. A lack of understanding of the private sector and distrust of “profiteers” by 
many relief agency staff, re-enforced by some actors’ exploitative business 
practices in many relief environments.  
4. Short-term, inflexible funding cycles, combined with the requirement to 
impact large numbers of people quickly, favors direct delivery of goods or 
services over the “indirect” use of local institutions and market channels, 
which often are weakened by the conflict.163 
 
When outside relief agencies overlook local markets, the targeted populations’ 
immediate needs are still often met. However, there may be significant unintended 
consequences, such as the following: 
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Unsustainable impact: Since the improved livelihoods are not based on viable 
market assumptions (such as appropriateness of technology, incentives, availability of 
inputs, and sufficient demand) impacts may be temporary or allow the exploitation of 
vulnerable household industries and small enterprises. 
Adverse impact on unaffected households: Relief donations that provide free 
primary goods often compete with the lower prices of commodities produced locally.  
The lower prices can mean that the local producer of that good can no longer survive 
from the income produced from developing the product.  Thus, relief donations can 
spread the economic hardship to previously healthy segments of the local economy.  For 
example, in Ethiopia aid organizations imported grain from outside of the country, in 
spite of grain surpluses within other regions of Ethiopia.  The introduction of free 
imported grains depressed prices, which reduced farmers’ incomes in food surplus areas 
and caused poverty to spread from the drought-affected areas to areas that were 
previously performing well economically.164  
Development of a “relief” or “dependency” culture: The delivery of supplies 
results in relief organizations developing internal capacity and host-population 
expectations that are only focused on the continued delivery of goods, a condition which 
is difficult to redirect towards development at a later date.  The American Refugee 
Committee (ARC), acting as the technical lead in an international NGO consortium 
conducting a value chain program in rural Sierra Leone, found that the entire system 
needed to be completely overhauled.  To successfully implement a program that built 
local capacity and removed the reliance on subsidies, the ARC stated that both the 
community members and the relief agency staff needed to be “de-programmed” from a 
relief mentality.165  
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2. Challenges of the Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction Model 
Although there is coherent logic to the post-war stabilization and reconstruction 
model and the strategies based on it, the model makes assumptions and ignores variables 
that cause a series of practical problems when applied to contemporary post-conflict 
settings.  The successful postcolonial transitions and the developmental failures in Africa 
provide additional evidence of the limitations of this model.  Appropriately, its potential 
effectiveness in post-civil war states, where the goal must include achieving economic 
stability without losing the peace, is even more questionable. 
Model applicability: First, the success of the model in post-World War II Europe 
occurred under dramatically different conditions than the current cases of peace 
implementation.  Post-World War II Western Europe faced the tasks of physical 
reconstruction and demobilization after an interstate war, with states that were victors and 
whose governmental and economic institutions were intact.  They did not have the 
additional considerations of state building, the integration of former enemies into one 
army and one society, overcoming underdevelopment, and the implementation of peace 
agreement conditions.  Moreover, the characteristics of a war economy in an 
industrialized state vary considerably from the war economies created by civil war in a 
developing country.  The obstacles to foreign investment in post-war Western Europe did 
not include the high level of uncertainty surrounding the prospects for peace and the 
absence of a capacity to enforce contracts, property rights, and the repatriation of profits.  
Further, while some countries had the risk of social revolution, they did not risk United 
States withdrawal.166 
Consequences of Macroeconomic Restraint: IFI policies of macroeconomic 
restraint prevent the public expenditures that are essential to peace, such as building a 
new competent civil administration, financing demobilization of combatants, and 
providing social infrastructure such as healthcare, vocational training, and schools.  In 
this area, the IMF and World Bank have clashed over their loan criteria, as experienced in 
the proposals for Mozambique, Nicarauga, and Macedonia.  However, the World Bank 
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tends to back down and defer to IMF targets on budget deficits despite their negative 
political effects.  For example, in its 1998 evaluation the Bank assessed that “the 
Cambodia case study finds that the Bank has continued to push for downsizing the civil 
services when the political coalition arrangement under the peace accords was based in 
part on raising the size of the civil service to absorb large numbers of the incoming 
parties’ functionaries.  The Bank’s position was not politically realistic from the 
outset.”167 
Immediate hardships: Immediately after implementation, traditional stabilization 
policies also tend to increase unemployment and exacerbate economic inequalities, when 
achieving the reverse is essential.  In addition, tight monetary policy inhibits accessible 
credit for the promotion of local small and medium enterprises (SMEs), even though the 
World Bank has acknowledged their critical importance in post-civil war development.  
Finally, rapid privatization and the promotion of agricultural exports can work directly 
counter to the politically crucial task of land reform and poverty reduction.168 
E. IMPACT OF RISK FACTORS 
1. Ethnic Factors  
The delivery of material aid in a manner that benefits a single ethnic faction can 
have a significant destabilizing effect within the state.  In a post-conflict society, “aid 
resources represent economic wealth and political power.”  As a consequence, control of 
aid resources becomes a powerful tool that enables leaders to exert control over the 
population.  Moreover, external aid can equate to military strength when it fulfills a 
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resources are freed up for military use.  In addition, militant groups can steal aid 
resources for either domestic use to support their armies or to resell to purchase 
weapons.169 
However, aid agencies often cannot or do not take the steps required to control the 
distribution of their resources in a manner that does not support ethnic warlords.  Aid 
agencies often do not speak the local language and must depend on local translators to 
distribute goods.  However, the ability to speak a foreign language and translate is 
demonstrative of educational access, an indicator of past privilege that was often based 
off of ethnic preferences.  Thus, aid becomes targeted to the translator’s ethnic group, 
which reinforces and worsens group dividers.  Additionally, ethnic warlords often control 
territory and coerce aid agencies to comply with the rules and restrictions they impose 
over their area of control. They may “tax aid goods, impose duties, establish currency 
exchanges rates, and restrict delivery sites and schedules.”170  This provides the militant 
leaders with income to finance the conflict, the ability to use aid delivery sites as a means 
to control where people do or do not live, and the affluence required to control the 
population’s loyalty.  Further, when aid agencies must receive permission from a warlord 
to gain access to the population that they intend to reach, the aid agency reinforces the 
legitimacy and power of the armed faction.   
2. Conflict Intensity  
Aid agencies have traditionally focused solely on their primary task of the 
delivery of relief goods or implementation of their economic development program, and 
have not sought to establish a domestic conflict management system.  However, civil 
wars that have high conflict intensity are also typically characterized by extensive 
population displacement and with that dispute over issues such as property rights.  The 
failure of relief and development agencies to implement aid programs in this situation 
without engaging in conflict resolution has aggravated conflicts.  For example, providing 
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aid to farmers occupying disputed lands exacerbates tensions and gives the appearance 
that the aid agency is legitimating the current occupancy, placing the aid agency on a side 
of the conflict.  Likewise, endemic problems such as cattle rustling are as much 
concerned with successful conflict management and resolution, as the development of 
husbandry skills.  The failure to develop locally based institutions that can resolve 
competing claims before distributing inputs has limited the effectiveness of the aid 
programs and at times contributed to the breakdown of the peace process.171 
3. Resource Dependency 
The likelihood of renewed conflict is significantly higher in highly resource-
dependent states.  Collier notes that although the effect from primary commodity exports 
is non-linear, “the risk of conflict peaks when they constitute around 32 percent of 
GDP.”172  The fact that their economies are less diversified generally indicates that these 
states have lower levels of economic capacity.  In an environment with high degrees of 
poverty, the potential wealth from the natural resources may “create predatory incentives 
that can lead to violence, or it can make it easier for rebel groups to finance a resumption 
of violence” if they gain control over lootable resources.173  Moreover, oil-rich countries 
usually have underdeveloped state institutions that allow rampant corruption and that 
cannot effectively rebuild their polities after internal conflict.174  Finally, natural resource 
dependence typically indicates an undiversified economy that is more vulnerable to 
commodity price shocks, has a limited ability to develop a manufacturing sector, and 
does not provide services that facilitate economic growth or develop human capital.175 
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International financial institutions have traditionally prioritized large-scale 
infrastructure projects that develop the natural resource sector as a means for the state to 
finance future development.  However, as the limitations above discuss, the development 
of extraction capacity does not automatically translate into economic development 
throughout the diverse segments of the post-conflict state.  IFIs must ensure that they do 
not limit their focus to a sole sector of the economy, especially when the development of 
that sector would only benefit a single faction and fuel a sense of injustice through the 
remainder of the population. 
F. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE CONCLUSION 
Civil war devastates a country, leaving its destructive mark on physical structures, 
governmental institutions, legal systems, and almost every facet of a state’s economic, 
political, and social fabric.  For economic assistance to be effective, it requires a careful 
and concerted approach that leverages domestic resources, international donor assistance, 
and private sector resources.  However, even in states not influenced by ethnic tensions, 
conflict intensity, and grievances induced by the level of economic development, the 
traditional approaches to delivering assistance have structural shortfalls that limit their 
effectiveness.  At a minimum, these agencies should establish a more holistic approach to 
assistance that attempts to account for and mitigate the harmful consequences that have 
consistently occurred due to the narrow focus of their specific program.   
The destabilizing impacts become even more pronounced in the presence of post-
conflict risk factors.  First, the limitations manifest within the agencies’ methods of 
delivering aid mean that aid is not distributed to diverse segments of the population, but 
is instead primarily delivered to a specific faction.  The ability of a particular faction to 
control aid resources reinforces the divisions and resentment that divided the factions 
during the conflict.  Second, the aid agencies’ dependency on regional warlords provides 
funding, power, and legitimacy to militant leaders.  Finally, international development 
programs focused on the extraction of resources fosters corruption and patronage in the 
absence of strong state institutions.  
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Both relief and developmental agencies must remain mindful that conflict is the 
primary threat to the humanitarian and economic development objectives they wish to 
achieve.  Consequently, these agencies must ensure that their policies do not undermine 
the peace process.  To be effective, aid agencies must prioritize delivering aid in a 
manner where policies or assistance that benefits one segment of the population does not 
needlessly devastate other segments of the population.  Additionally, aid agencies need to 
strengthen their commitment to increasing local capacity.  Accordingly, they should build 
their programs from a foundation that prioritizes the use of the local population and 






Even after their resolution, civil wars leave a horrible legacy for the post-conflict 
state.  The scars from violence limit the state’s ability to recover from the conflict and 
strengthen the influence of the militant leaders within the society.  Moreover, researchers 
have identified specific factors that impact the probability of renewed violence — among 
these, ethnic violence, conflict intensity, and economic development significantly 
increase the likelihood of civil war renewal.  At the same time, the international 
community has executed democratization programs, peacekeeping missions, and 
economic assistance as their primary strategies to stabilize post-conflict states.  However, 
international efforts have not always accounted for the destabilizing influences that occur 
when risk variables interact with international action.   
This thesis identifies four items as reoccurring impediments that have contributed 
to the collapse of the post-conflict peace: (1) the reinforcement of factional divisions 
produced during the conflict, (2) the empowerment of extremist/militant leaders, (3) the 
funding of militant groups, (4) and the distribution of wealth through patronage or along 
factional lines.  Tragically, when policymakers have not accounted for the spillover 
effects that will occur due to the risk variables, international actions have actually 
exacerbated tensions and contributed to the renewal of violence.  Thus, the thesis 
concludes with recommendations across each course of action to help account for these 
risk variables. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
These recommendations identify the peacekeeping and economic assistance 
pillars as the primary areas that can help stabilize the peace immediately following the 
resolution of a conflict.  Providing security is the first requirement to sustaining post-civil 
war peace.  In addition, immediately after security is established, the rapid delivery of 
economic assistance is critical to the success of the peacekeeping mission.  However, the 
author views democratization as a destabilizing force immediately following an internal 
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conflict.  Instead, the priority for governance should be the development of institutions 
and local governance capacity — two actions that support the immediate goal of 
sustaining the peace and lay the groundwork for the long-term goal of democratic 
governance.   
The following recommendations are designed to mitigate the spillover effects that 
currently occur in the execution of international action.  The broad goals that underlie 
these recommendations include: (1) fostering the population’s support for the peace 
process, (2) undermining the power of warlords and increasing the influence of leaders 
who advocate peace, (3) disrupting the sources of militant financing, and (4) encouraging 
projects that force collaboration and spread benefits across factional lines. 
C. PEACEKEEPING PRIORITIES 
1. Establish Immediate Influence with the Local Population 
Despite the progress that the UN has made in revamping its peacekeeping 
capabilities, it still needs to improve its response to the challenges that threaten peace 
immediately following the resolution of the conflict.  To improve in this area, 
peacekeeping missions must establish a stronger initial security presence that reaches the 
local population.  The peacekeepers must establish themselves as a legitimate military 
presence that reduces the population’s need to turn to warlords for security.  Military 
capacity and presence are essential for disrupting the militant’s hold over the population 
and creating space for moderate leaders to regain influence. 
Additionally, peacekeeping missions must place more emphasis on providing 
peace dividends to the population immediately after establishing a mission in the country.  
Mission commanders need to look for quick wins they can achieve in order to gain the 
initial support of the population and give them the confidence that life will offer more in 
peace than in war.  Actions such as providing security, distributing food, cleaning rubble, 
and offering medical clinics are often overlooked by individuals focused on major 
reforms such as establishing government institutions.  These small tasks provide 
peacekeepers with credibility from the individuals on the ground — an essential part of 
undermining indigenous leaders in the population who are hostile to the peace process 
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and are attempting to turn the population against the peacekeepers and their objectives.  
Additionally, these initial successes provide the peacekeeping mission with the support 
and time needed to make the more extensive institutional changes that, while they must 
occur to establish a functioning state, take longer periods of time before they bring a 
positive impact to the population. 
Finally, peacekeeping commanders must develop a problem resolution and 
reconciliation strategy that they will use to address the grievances that exist between 
adversarial factions within the population.  This strategy should include the consent and 
participation of local leaders that reflect the diverse interest of the local population.  To 
find the local leaders, peacekeepers should seek traditional leaders that have had their 
power usurped by militants.  These leaders are usually seen as the legitimate authorities 
within the population and also have an incentive to work with the peacekeeping forces.  
In addition, the peacekeepers should get inputs and feedback from diverse segments of 
the society on qualified local leaders.  The underlying objectives are to establish a 
conflict resolution process that holds legitimacy with the local population and to 
empower local leaders that are committed to peace and will see the process succeed. 
2. Integration of Peacekeeping and Financial Resources 
Economic growth is critical in supporting incentives for peace and helps achieve 
war avoidance even in the absence of an extensive international commitment.  However, 
IFIs currently focus on large developmental projects that have their potential positive 
impacts negated by the factional divisions and weak governance capacity that 
characterize post-conflict states.  Moreover, in Central American peacekeeping missions 
during the 1990s, the lack of coordination between economic policy-making institutions 
with the UN “prevented any discussion of the way budget cuts and trade 
liberalization…might affect the poor and peacebuilding in the fragile conditions of a war-
torn society.”176  On the other end of the spectrum, relief agencies typically do not have a  
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strategy in place to transition from the delivery of direct aid to economic development.  
Furthermore, they do not have the ability to deliver aid without negotiating with, and thus 
empowering, warlords.   
These limitations point to the need to transfer the control of economic 
development initiatives that will actually occur within the post-civil war state to the 
control of the peacekeeping mission.  As part of the peacekeeping mission’s mandate, the 
UN needs to empower the missions with the resources needed to start grassroots 
economic growth.  Ideas for doing this may include providing the UN mission 
commanders with an equivalent of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
(CERP) funds that have proven effective in the United States stabilization efforts in Iraq.  
Another option could be the establishment of provisional reconstruction teams that 
include representatives from the local community, the peacekeeping force, and from aid 
agencies such as the World Bank. The ability of peacekeepers to rapidly spur economic 
development has proven to have a substantial impact in securing the peace.  Accordingly, 
in addition to addressing the security dilemma that occurs after a conflict, the most 
successful peacekeeping missions have also established a peace dividend by providing 
immediate incentives to former combatants that made it more beneficial to remain at 
peace than to return to conflict.177 
3. Building Local Capacities for Peace 
After establishing an immediate presence, peacekeeping missions in conjunction 
with developmental agencies should make the expansion of local capacities for peace a 
focus of their strategies.  A method to accomplish this is hiring individuals from all sides 
of the conflict for job training programs and then providing a safe place to conduct the 
program.  The program should provide a strong focus on reconciliation, and enlist the 
support of community advocates who can resolve issues discussed during the 
reconciliation process. Methods to do this could include providing a common area where 
individuals from different factions can meet with the support of peace facilitators, and 
engaging with local leaders who want to support the peace process.  
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The leaders of the militant factions will discourage activities designed to alleviate 
tensions.  However, strengthening cross-line communications can undercut the militant 
leaders by providing a forum that supports the elements within neighboring communities 
that need peaceful cooperation to accomplish mutual interest.  Even the partial restoration 
of communication networks and cooperation can allow neighbors to graze animals, trade, 
and maintain other ties even while the factions’ leaders seek to reignite violence.  These 
actions present the population with tangible benefits that can come from conflict 
resolution and cooperation, rather than leaving the concept of peace as an abstraction that 
gets drowned out by the accusations and hostile rhetoric used by violence instigators.178 
An additional key consideration is establishing collaboration that will last beyond 
the life of the aid program.  In order to prevent a parallel economy that will collapse once 
the aid organization leaves, the training programs need to provide the skills that will 
benefit the local community.  Additionally, the reconciliation programs should be built on 
the sustainable processes and structures that emanate from existing civil society, and give 
credibility to local leaders.  This partnership with local leaders is essential to ensure the 
expansion of the peace process throughout the local community and to empower the 
leaders that are advocating disengagement from conflict.179 
Finally, the peacekeeping and developmental organizations can take steps to 
ensure that incentives exist to promote interfactional cooperation.  One method is to 
encourage economic interdependence by linking local production and consumption 
initiatives between former belligerents.  As an example Luo, Kuria, and Maasai ethnic 
leaders in Kenya defused tensions that were escalating from a sustained resource conflict 
by donating land for an agricultural and livestock development training center.  The 
center brought together pastoralists and farmers from the different groups, provided a 
reconciliation process to address issues remaining from the conflict, and created 
economic linkages between the ethnicities that created financial benefits for all the 
groups, reinforcing the motivation for further collaboration.  The combination of local 
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leader involvement, reconciliation efforts, and economic incentives for collaboration 
resulted in a decrease in cattle raiding and ethnic clashes, and provided a model that was 
used successfully in neighboring communities.180 
D. INTERNATIONAL PRIORITIES 
1. Aligning Macro-Economic Policies with Peacekeeping Objectives 
The international community must address the gap that exists between 
macroeconomic policies and the impact they have on the population at the micro level.  
Macro-economic policies must bring both financial and social stability; thus, efforts to 
bring a government into fiscal solvency must be implemented in a manner that does not 
destabilize the government.  The international community typically provides support to 
build infrastructure — police stations, courthouses, schools, and hospitals.  However, it 
often refuses to fund salaries for the government employees that make up the security 
services, teachers, and hospital staffs.  Further, macro-level economic policy has 
traditionally called for state austerity programs that call for the firing of state employees.  
This policy destabilizes the government and disrupts the state’s ability to deliver public 
services, which in turn hinders development.  
2. Targeting Rebel Financing 
The control of commodities has allowed militant leaders to do extremely well 
financially, despite the economic hardship that the conflict creates for the vast majority of 
the state’s population.  For example, control of diamond reserves allowed Jose Savimbi, 
the leader of the group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 
to amass an estimated net worth of four billion dollars in the 1990s.  Accordingly, the 
international community should aggressively target sources of rebel financing and should 
seek to reduce the profits militants can make through the sale of commodities.  The 
Kimberley process provides one model of disrupting a militant organization’s access to 
the markets.  The Kimberley process began in 2002 as a certification system for rough 
diamonds that agreed to a minimum standard for certificates of origin to ensure that the 
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diamonds were not produced by rebel groups.  The process has established a sequence of 
internal controls that could be replicated in other commodity markets, such as coltan and 
timber.  Additionally, international actors should seek to impose regulations within the 
commodity markets that reduce the customers for illegal goods and force militants to sell 
their items at a deep discount, which in turn reduces their profits.181   
3. Mitigating the Risks from Natural Resources 
A typical pattern develops after natural resources are discovered in a post-conflict 
country — an undefined amount of money starts flowing in; politicians and government 
employees divert much of it into their private bank accounts; and the masses are left 
nearly as poor as before and are increasingly angry.182  Consequently, the international 
community in general and IFIs specifically must take steps to mitigate the risks that occur 
from natural resources before committing funds to develop the sector.  The first step in 
this is developing the means to accurately report the revenues received from sale of the 
resources.  Since the factions within the state often do not trust information provided by 
the government, corporations involved in the extraction of resources in post-conflict 
states should be required by law to provide independent reporting information.  This 
information can be provided directly if deemed appropriate by the corporation.  If 
confidentiality is warranted, individual companies can provide their information to an 
IFI, which then collates the data and provides the information in a single report.  Failure 
to comply with this requirement should bring the threat of intervention by Security 
Council states and the delisting of the corporation from major stock exchanges.183  By 
establishing a system where an outside entity reports on the revenues from natural 
resources, the international community can force a change to the system that would 
reduce the ambiguity that fosters corruption and patronage.  
The second component to this process is reaching an agreement as to how the 
revenues from the resources will get distributed.  The method used by the World Bank in 
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Chad starting in 2000 provides a template of taking the required actions to mitigate the 
risks of future conflict before pursuing development projects.  Oil was found in Chad 
during the 1950s, but civil wars through the 1960s to 1990 made it impossible to extract.  
After 1990, Exxon tried to raise capital to start building infrastructure.  However, the 
risks remained too high to attract private financing and it needed World Bank 
participation to raise the required capital and provide leverage over the government.  
Once the World Bank got involved, it mandated that Chad’s government commit itself to 
transparency in the management of its oil income and that revenues must be used for 
poverty reduction programs.   
This law resulted in the Petroleum Revenue Management Law that stipulates that 
all direct oil revenues must go to an offshore escrow account.  From here, ten percent is 
transferred to a Future Generations Fund, 80 percent is committed to poverty reduction, 
five percent goes to the local communities in the oil producing region, and the remainder 
goes to administration expenses and general expenditures.  Additionally, a watchdog 
organization, the College de Controle et Surveillance des Ressources Peroliers, has been 
created that certifies the parliamentary budget conforms to the petroleum law and 
authorizes all disbursements from the oil revenue account.  This organization holds 
members from various organizations and includes two members from parliament, four 
from civil society organizations, a member from the Supreme Court, the treasury director, 
and the national director of Chad’s central bank.184  The checks and balances instituted 
through this system have diffused tensions that existed after the civil war.  There is little 
talk of secession by the oil producing regions, and the population has a general sense that 
the oil revenues are getting used for purposes that benefit the country as a whole. 
E. SUMMARY 
Stabilization doctrine has traditionally emphasized development and security, and 
experience provides evidence of their interdependence.  Michael Shafer notes that the 
doctrine attempts to address both ends of the instability equation: “development polices 
seek to ameliorate the overwhelming demands unleashed by social mobilization, and 
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security policies attempt to bolster the underwhelming capabilities of new states that they 
may manage disruptions while forging ahead with modernization.”185  Without security, 
development is impossible; without good government and economic progress, efforts to 
maintain it will be futile. 
The actions must be made in a manner that does not undermine the fragile peace 
that exists in many post-civil war states.  However, before implementing policies it is 
possible to identify many of the risk factors that can undermine international efforts.  
Identification of the threats then allows policymakers to tailor the response in a way that 
ensures the correct actions are done in a sequence that minimizes the threats that can 
bring the country back into conflict.  In each of the areas studied, specific risk factors 
pose direct challenges to efforts to reform governance, establish security, and support 
economic development.  Consequently, at a minimum the international community must 
demonstrate the commitment to contribute the resources and institute the policies 
required to effectively mitigate these risks.  Failure to meet this minimum threshold 
across all three of these pillars results in the actions taken by the international community 
having no statistically significant effect on sustaining the peace.  Moreover, responses by 
the international community that do not have the capacity required to account for these 
risk factors actually increase the probability of the state returning to civil war.   
By assessing the risk factors present within the civil war state, policymakers have 
the ability to assess the post-conflict environment and decide if they are willing to make 
the commitment the state requires to be a force for peace.  However, this requires 
coordination across multiple organizations to implement a comprehensive approach in 
stabilizing the state.  Additionally, before committing peacekeepers, instituting 
governance reform efforts, or making economic assistance conditions and policies, the 
decision makers in each of these areas must have the ability to assess if risk conditions 
exist that would indicate their proposed actions will destabilize the state.  If the 
institutions required to meet these challenges are unwilling to coordinate their effort and 
make the commitment to tailor their response to the needs of the post-civil war, the 
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international community needs to resist the pressure to meddle in the state, implement 
policies that are doomed from the start, and exacerbate a bad situation. 
 81
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APPENDIX 1 — DEFINING CIVIL WAR 
The basic definition of civil war shared across the literature defines civil war as 
occurring when an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government militarily 
and the resulting violence results in more than 1,000 combat-related deaths, with at least 
five percent on each side.  However, Doyle and Sambanis thoroughly capture the 
multiple considerations that researchers must consider when categorizing conflicts and 
classify an armed conflict as a civil war when: 
1. The war takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the 
international system with a population of 500,000 or greater.186 
2. The parties are politically and militarily organized and they have 
publically stated political objectives.187 
3. The government (through its military or militias) is a principal 
combatant.  If there is no functioning government, then the party representing the 
government internationally and/or claiming the state domestically must be 
involved as a combatant.188 
4. The main insurgent organization(s) is locally represented and must 
recruit locally.  Additional external involvement and recruitment need not imply 
that the war is not intrastate.189  Insurgent groups may operate from neighboring 
countries, but they must also have some territorial control (bases) in the civil war 
country and/or the rebels must reside in the civil war country.  This criterion 
eliminates interstate conflicts with no local participation from consideration.190 
                                                 
186 This includes states that are occupying foreign territories that are claiming independence (i.e., the 
West Bank and Gaza in Israel and the Western Sahara in Morocco).  A strict application of this coding rule 
would drop these cases if the international community through the UN rejects the state’s claim of 
sovereignty on the occupied territories. 
187 This applies to the majority parties in the conflict.  The criterion distinguishes insurgent groups and 
political parties from criminal gangs and riotous mobs.  “Terrorist” organizations would qualify as 
insurgent groups if they caused violence at the required levels for war.  Noncombatant populations that are 
often victimized in civil wars are not considered a “party” to the war if they are not organized in militia or 
in some form able  to apply violence in pursuit of their political objectives. 
188 Extensive direct support (monetary, organizational, or military) by the government to militias 
might also satisfy this criterion.  In cases where the state has collapsed, it may not be possible to identify 
parties representing the state as all parties may be claiming to be the legitimate state regime, and these 
conflicts become hard to distinguish from intercommunal violence (i.e., Somalia after 1991).  
189 A civil war can occur at the same time as an interstate war. 
190  Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace 
Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 133-134. 
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Additionally, the criteria for coding the start and end dates of the conflict are also 
specified.  The criteria to determine the dates include: 
1. The start year of the war is the identified as the first year the 
conflict causes at least 500-1000 deaths.  If the conflict has not caused 500 
deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started that year 
only if the cumulative deaths in the next three years reach 1,000.191 
2. Throughout its duration, the conflict is characterized by sustained 
violence at least at the minor or intermediate level.  The war is coded as 
terminate if a three-year period occurs during which the conflict causes 
fewer than 500 deaths.192  In such a case, the end date of the war is 
considered the last year that produced more than 100 deaths (unless one of 
the other rules applies). 
3. Throughout the war, the weaker party is able to mount effective 
resistance.  Effective resistance is measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted 
on the stronger party.  A substantial number of these deaths must occur in 
the first year of the war.  But if violence becomes effectively one-sided, 
even if the aggregate effective resistance threshold of 100 deaths has 
already been met, the civil war must be coded as having ended and the 
violence is considered to have transitioned to a politicide or other form of 
one-sided violence.193 
4. A peace treaty that marks at least six months of peace marks an 
end to the war.  Treaties that do not stop the fighting are not considered 
(i.e., the 1993 Islamabad Accords and the 1997 agreement among Somali 
clan leaders). 
5. A decisive military victory by the rebels that produces a new 
regime marks the end of the war.194   Since civil war is understood as an 
                                                 
191 Given the difficulty in collecting accurate data to accurately determine civil war onset, if a good 
estimate of deaths does not exist for the first year, the onset is coded as the first year of reported large-scale 
armed conflict provided that the violence continues or escalates in the following years. 
192 Three years is an arbitrary cutoff point, but is a consistent threshold found in the literature.  This 
coding rule is necessary to prevent coding an ongoing civil war for years after the violence has ended, and 
several cases have occurred where the coding of civil war termination has been determined by this 
criterion.  A second, more lenient version that is also used is a five-year period with fewer than 500 deaths.  
193 This criterion distinguishes cases in which insurgent violence was limited to the outbreak of the 
war, and for the remainder of the conflict the government engaged in one-sided violence.  A hypothetical 
example is a case where insurgents inflicted 100 deaths on the government in the first week of fighting, and 
then the government defeated the insurgents and engaged in pogroms and politicide for several years with 
few deaths on the government side. 
194 Thus, in secessionist wars that are won by rebels who establish a new state, if a war erupts 
immediately in the new state it is coded as a new war onset in the new state (i.e., Croatia in 1992-1995), 
even is the violence is closely related to the preceding war. 
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armed conflict against the government, continuing armed conflict against a 
new government implies a new civil war. If the government wins the war, 
a period of peace that last longer than six months must persist before 
considering renewed violence a new civil war. 
6. A cease-fire, truce, or end to the fighting results in at least two 
years of peace.195  The period of peace must be longer than what is 
required in the case of a peace agreement, as it is impossible to discern the 
parties’ intent to negotiate an agreement in the case of a truce/ceasefire. 
7. If new parties enter the war over new issues, a new civil war onset 
should be coded, subject to the same operational criteria stated above.  If 
the same parties return to war over the same issues, this is generally 
considered a continuation of the old war, unless any of the above criteria 
for coding a war end apply for the period before the resurgence of 
fighting.196 
                                                 
195 Peace implies no battle-related deaths, or in a lenient version of this criterion, fewer deaths than the 
lowest threshold of deaths used to code war onset (i.e., fewer than 100 deaths per year). 
196 Ibid., 134-136. 
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APPENDIX 2 — METHODOLOGY OF PRIMARY VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: To measure civil war onset, many studies used the 
Uppsala/PRIO armed conflict dataset (Version 3.0) (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 
Wilhelmsen & Gleditsch, 2004).  This thesis focused on internal conflicts and 
consequently only used studies focused on inter-state violence. 
Independent Variables: The majority of the variables listed below come out of 
the Schneider Wiesehomeier study.  They use the Golder (2004, 2005) dataset on 
democratic institutions as the primary source for their data. 
Ethnic fractionalization: This variable is measured using Fearon (2003), who 
relied on the Encyclopedia Britannica and other sources; the fractionalization index 
ranges from 0 to 1 and is current to the year 2000. 
Ethnic dominance: Studies used two different methods to measure ethnic 
dominance.  Many studies used Collier (2001) or the updated Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
classification of a dichotomous variable to measure ethnic polarization, coding the 
variable as positive if an ethnic group represents 45–90 percent of the population.  
Schneider and Wiesehomeier’s study uses a narrower range of 60–90 percent of the 
population for this variable.  
Ethnic polarization: Studies used the formula provided by Reynal-Querol (2002) 
to calculate ethnic polarization.197  The variable equals 1 for cases of highly polarized 
societies and 0 for the others.  Schneider & Wiesehomeier also introduce a dummy 
variable in their study to compensate for the high correlation between ethnic 
fractionalization and ethnic polarization. 
Majoritarian system: This dichotomous variable is given the value 1 if a country 
uses a majoritarian electoral system; all other electoral systems receive a value of 0.  The 
majoritarian category includes political systems that employ plurality rule as well as 
those that use absolute and qualified majority requirements.   
                                                 
197 See also Reynal-Querol, 2005; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005. 
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Proportional system: This dichotomous variable indicates a value of 1 whether a country 
uses a proportional electoral formula with either a single tier or multiple electoral tiers. 
Effective number of parties: This variable indicates the effective number of electoral 
parties in a country. It was calculated with the formula from Laakso & Taagepera (1979), 
1/vi2, where vi is the percentage of the vote received by the ith party, and independents 
or others are treated as a single party.   
Average district magnitude:  This variable is calculated as the total number of 
seats allocated in the lowest tier divided by the number of districts in that tier.  It is used 
alone and in conjunction with the majoritarian variable, under the thought that large 
districts offset the winner-takes-all logic of the plurality rule.   
Federalism: This institutional variable is included to measure the degree of 
centralization, which may influence the risk of a civil war onset.  This dichotomous 
variable was taken from Polity III and updated for the post-1994 years using Griffiths & 
Nerenberg (2005), Gerring & Thacker (2004), Gerring, Thacker & Moreno (2005) and, 
for African countries, Kuenzi & Lambright (2005).  It is 1 when a country is 
geographically decentralized in terms of decision-making authority and 0 otherwise. 
Presidential system: This is a dummy variable that is given the value 1 if a 
country is classified as a presidential democracy and 0 if not.  The president may be 
elected directly or indirectly; the decisive criterion is whether a president is able to select 
a government and determine its survival.  It was complemented for some African 
countries using Kuenzi & Lambright (2005). 
Control Variables: The Schneider Wiesehomeier study includes control 
variables that proved to exert a robust influence on the risk of conflict in the meta-
analysis of Hegre & Sambanis (2006) and other recent statistical studies on the causes of 
civil war onset. 
Population size: This is an important control variable, since bigger countries 
produce for a larger domestic market and are less outward looking economically as a 
consequence.  The Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers & Aten, 2002) 
provided the data.   
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Economic development: This variable will be measured through the GDP per 
capita, with data from the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 using its log transformation. 
Regime durability: In their studies, Hegre et al. and Fearon and Laitin, provide 
evidence that political instability increases the risk of civil war onset.  The Polity IV data 
set (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000) measures the polity durability since the last transition or 
since 1900. 
Conflict duration: Various studies obtained their data for this variable from the 
Correlates of War database (Walter 2004).  The measure varied from a duration low of 
one week to a high of 396 months and was calculated using a log transformation. 
Conflict intensity: Hartzell and Hoddie operationalize this variable as an 
additional one thousand battle deaths per month employing a log transformation. 
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APPENDIX 3 — TABLE OF CIVIL WAR VARIABLES 
Table 6.   Post-WWII Determinants of Civil War Onset 
Variable  Study  Finding 
State Characteristics       
Population (ln)  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  S  p<0.01 
Proximity of Independence  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  S  p<0.01 
  Vreeland (2008)  NS   
Proximity of Civil War  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  S  p<0.001 
  Vreeland (2008)  S  p<0.05 
Neighboring Civil War  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  NS   
  Vreeland (2008)  NS   
Previous Regime Type  Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)  S  p<0.05 
  Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)  NS   
  Walter (2004)  NS   
Foreign Aid Levels  Grossman (1992)  NS   
  Collier & Hoeffler (2002)  NS   
       
War Resolution       
Decisive Victory  Walter (2004)  NS   
Grievances Settled  Walter (2004)  NS   
Partition  Walter (2004)  NS   
       
Government Type       
Democracy  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  NS   
  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  S  p<0.01 
Liberal Democracy  Walter (2004)  NS   
Majoritarian  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  NS   
Federalism  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  NS   
Presidentialism  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  S  p<0.01 
Proportional System  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  NS   
Semi‐democracy  Henderson & Singer (2000)  S  p<0.01 
Clear Autocracy  Walter (2004)  NS   
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Government Reformation       
Proximity of Regime Change  Vreeland (2008)  S  p<0.05 
Small Level of Democratization  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  S  p<0.05 
Large Level of Democratization  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  NS   
Small Level of Autocratization  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  S  p<0.05 
Large Level of Autocratization  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  S  p<0.001 
       
Ethnic Factors       
Ethnic Basis to the Conflict  Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)  NS   
  Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)  S  p<0.05 
  Walter (2004)  NS   
Heterogeneity/Fractionalization  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  S  p<0.05 
  Papaioannou and Siourounis (2006)  S  p<0.05 
  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  NS   
  Vreeland (2008)  S  p<0.05 
Ethnic Dominance  Henderson & Singer (2000)  NS   
  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  S  p<0.01 
Polarization   Henderson & Singer (2000)  S  p<0.05 
  Ostby (2008)  NS   
  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  S  p<0.01 
       
Conflict Costs       
Conflict Intensity  Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)  S  p<0.001 
  Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)  S  p<0.01 
  Walter (2004)  NS   
Conflict Duration*   Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)  S  p<0.01 
  Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)  NS   
  Walter (2004)  S  p<0.01 
       
 
Development (ln)        
  Auvinen (1997)  S  p<0.05 
  Collier & Hoeffler (1998)  S  p<0.01 
  Henderson & Singer (2000)  S  p<0.01 
  Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch (2001)  S  p<0.05 
  Walter (2004)  S  p<0.01 
  Collier & Sambanis (2005)  S  p<0.01 
  Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom (2008)  S  p<0.05 
  Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)  S  p<0.05 
  Vreeland (2008)  S  p<0.05 
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Poverty  Goldstone et al. (2003)  S  p<0.05 
  Fearon & Laitin (2003)  NS   
  Collier & Hoeffler (2004)  S  p<0.01 
  Sambanis & Hegre (2006)  S  p<0.01 
  Alexander (2007)  NS   
       
Natural Resources       
General       
  de Soya (2002)  S  p<0.05 
  Addison, Le Billon & Murshed (2003)  S  p<0.05 
  Fearon & Laitin (2003)  NS   
  Collier & Hoeffler (2004)  S  p<0.01 
  Mueller (2004)  S  p<0.01 
  Ross (2004)  S  p<0.05 
  Fearon (2005)  NS   
  Bates (2008)  NS   
Oil  de Soya (2002)  S  p<0.01 
  Addison, Le Billon & Murshed (2003)  S  p<0.01 
  Fearon & Laitin (2003)  S  p<0.05 
  Ross (2003)  S  p<0.01 
  Ross (2004)  S  p<0.01 
  Collier & Hoeffler (2004)  S  p<0.05 
  Fearon (2005)  S  p<0.05 
  Bates (2008)  S  p<0.05 
       
Peace Agreement Features       
Power sharing Institutions  Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)  S  p<0.01 
Territorial Autonomy  Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)  S  p<0.05 
Third‐party enforcer  Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild (2001)  S  p<0.001 
  Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)  S  p<0.01 
       
* Variables in italics indicate factors that reduce the likelihood of civil war onset.   
S=Significant Correlation       
NS=Not Significant Correlation       
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